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INTRODUCTION
In carrying out their duties, federal administrative agencies must
often interpret statutes and regulations that are not entirely clear.
Sometimes an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous legal text may
not seem like the best or most natural interpretation of that text.
Nonetheless, a staple of modern federal administrative law doctrine is
the principle of judicial deference to administrative interpretations of
both congressional statutes and agency regulations.  The seminal case
on judicial deference to reasonable agency statutory interpretations is,
of course, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.1  In the context of administrative interpretations of the agency’s
own regulations, the leading authority is the Supreme Court’s 1945
decision in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,2 which held that an
agency’s construction of its own regulation should be given “control-
ling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regu-
lation.”3  More recent Supreme Court cases—including Thomas
Jefferson University v. Shalala4 and Auer v. Robbins5—have reaf-
firmed the Seminole Rock principle of judicial deference to an
agency’s reasonable construction of its own regulations.
Although Chevron deference and Seminole Rock deference are
closely related, there has been much more thorough exploration of the
theoretical underpinnings and practical consequences of Chevron.
This has not eliminated doubt or disagreement about the nature, va-
lidity, or wisdom of Chevron deference, but a consensus has gradually
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  We are grateful to Jody Freeman, Kristin Hick-
man, John Manning, Adrian Vermeule, Kathryn Watts, and participants at the ABA Administra-
tive Law Section’s 2010 Annual Meeting for helpful comments on earlier drafts.  We also thank
Jessica Palmer for excellent research assistance.
** J.D., 2010, Harvard Law School.
1 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron
held that if the relevant statute is silent or ambiguous on the question at issue, the reviewing
court “may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpre-
tation made by the administrator of the agency.” Id. at 844.
2 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
3 Id. at 414.
4 Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (1994).
5 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
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emerged that Chevron is grounded in a presumption (likely a legal
fiction) about congressional intent.  That presumption is in turn
grounded in a set of pragmatic considerations—most notably exper-
tise, accountability, and uniformity—that are thought to favor admin-
istrative over judicial construction.6  Furthermore, in part because of
the self-conscious and sophisticated reflection on Chevron’s justifica-
tions, courts and commentators have become increasingly attentive to
questions regarding the proper scope and limits of what Professors
Merrill and Hickman have described as “Chevron’s domain.”7  Al-
though  Chevron was widely seen as replacing an open-ended,
multifactor inquiry with a more rule-like framework,8 a strain in the
doctrine and commentary has long suggested that the case for Chev-
ron deference is not equally strong in all contexts, and indeed such
deference might sometimes be inappropriate.9
This view reached its apotheosis in United States v. Mead Corp.,10
in which the Supreme Court held that some agency statutory interpre-
tations—particularly those contained in interpretive rules, informal
orders, or other pronouncements issued without extensive proce-
dures—were presumptively not entitled to Chevron deference.11  Such
interpretations fall outside Chevron’s domain, and therefore receive at
most a measure of judicial respect, pursuant to the Court’s 1944 deci-
sion in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.12  Although Mead and much subse-
6 At least three members of the current Supreme Court have explicitly endorsed this
account of Chevron. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38
ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV.
2245, 2379–80 (2001); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517.  Prominent scholars have also endorsed this understanding as
providing the best account of the Chevron doctrine. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hick-
man, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administra-
tion After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2086 (1990).
7 Merrill & Hickman, supra note 6.  This cluster of related issues is also sometimes re-
ferred to as “Chevron Step Zero.” See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187
(2006).
8 See Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the
Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 14–15 (1990); Yoav Dotan, Making Consistency Consistent, 57
ADMIN. L. REV. 995, 1019 (2005); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the
Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1243, 1257–58 (2007); John F. Manning,
Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 612, 623–25 (1996).
9 See Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t
Get It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 17–23, 25–26 (1996); Anthony, supra note 8, at 1–4, 12–14,
31–42, 55–58; Merrill & Hickman, supra note 6, at 889–920.
10 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
11 Id. at 227, 235–38.
12 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).2011] SEMINOLE ROCK’S DOMAIN 1451
quent commentary emphasized procedural formality as the key
consideration marking the boundaries of Chevron’s domain, other
strands of the doctrine have suggested that something less than full
Chevron deference might be appropriate when, for example, several
agencies share interpretive authority over the same statute,13 when an
agency’s interpretation of a statutory provision has been inconsistent
over time,14 or when the interpretive question is unusually fundamen-
tal or important.15  The academic literature is rife with proposals for
further refinements to Chevron’s domain,16 as well as defenses and
criticisms of the limits the Court has already developed.17
By contrast, courts and commentators have paid less attention to
analogous questions regarding Seminole Rock’s domain.  Indeed,
Seminole Rock has attracted less attention and discussion than Chev-
ron in general, and the discussion that does exist has tended to focus
on wholesale critiques or defenses of Seminole Rock,18 rather than
questions regarding possible limits on the set of administrative inter-
13 See, e.g., Collins v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 351 F.3d 1246, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
Rapaport v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervision, 59 F.3d. 212, 216–17 (D.C.
Cir. 1995).
14 See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994); Good Samaritan
Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993); Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 698
(1991); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987). But see, e.g., Nat’l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173, 186–87 (1991).
15 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534–35 (2007); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v.
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 229 (1994); see also Anthony, supra note 8, at 9–12; Abigail R.
Moncrieff, Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exception to Chevron Deference As a Doctrine
of Noninterference (or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got It Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593,
594–95 (2008).
16 See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 8; David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelega-
tion Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201; Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J.
549 (2009); Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and
Transparency in the Administrative State, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1198–1201 (2009); Moncrieff,
supra note 15; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Democratizing the Administrative State, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 559, 584–85, 610–11 (2006).
17 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005); Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards,
Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 809 (2002); Merrill & Hickman, supra
note 6, at 858–60; Pierce, supra note 16, at 563; Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitu-
tion Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory
Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 533–34 (2006); Adrian Vermeule, Introduction, Mead in
the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 347 (2003).
18 See, e.g., Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock Defer-
ence to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 112 (2000); Anthony, supra
note 9, at 6; Manning, supra note 8; Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spec-
trum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 832–33, 838
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pretations that qualify for such deference.  Yet this is starting to
change: emerging strands of both the academic literature and the
caselaw have begun to take seriously, and to grapple with, questions
regarding Seminole Rock’s proper scope.19  This trend has accelerated
in the wake of Mead.  Indeed, post-Mead circuit court cases have sent
mixed signals regarding the effect of that decision on Seminole Rock
deference.20  This Article builds on prior work by posing—and sug-
gesting some preliminary answers to—the question of whether there
ought to be limits to Seminole Rock’s domain, comparable (though
perhaps not identical) to the limits that have been advocated, and in
some cases recognized, for Chevron’s domain.
We have three objectives in this Article: the first is descriptive,
the second analytic, and the third prescriptive.  Our descriptive objec-
tive is to provide a succinct summary of the state of the current doc-
trine regarding the limits—or lack thereof—on Seminole Rock’s
domain.  Our analytic objective is to develop a taxonomy of the con-
siderations that courts might plausibly use to develop midlevel doctri-
19 See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 16, at 604–08.
20 Compare United States v. Lachman, 387 F.3d 42, 54 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing United States
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)) (requiring interpretive statements to be both public and
formal in order to receive Seminole Rock deference), Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. v. Thompson,
380 F.3d 142, 154–55 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying Mead and Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576
(2000), to invalidate an agency’s informally promulgated interpretation of a regulation), Keys v.
Barnhart, 347 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating in dicta that there is likely “little left” of
Seminole Rock after Mead), Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, L.L.C., 305 F.3d 1228, 1238 (11th Cir.
2002) (giving Skidmore rather than Seminole Rock deference to agency opinion letters interpret-
ing regulations), and U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Comm’r, 270 F.3d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir. 2001)
(holding that Mead requires application of Skidmore rather than Seminole Rock deference to
informal interpretations of existing agency regulations), with Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v.
Leavitt, 509 F.3d 1259, 1272 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that after Christensen, “[i]nformal inter-
pretations . . . merit deference where they interpret an ambiguous regulation,” but not when they
interpret an ambiguous statute), Excel Corp. v. USDA, 397 F.3d 1285, 1296 (10th Cir. 2005)
(holding that a court must “defer to both formal and informal agency interpretations of an am-
biguous regulation” (internal quotation marks omitted)), Humanoids Grp. v. Rogan, 375 F.3d
301, 306 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that Christensen’s distinction between the level of deference
due to formal and informal agency interpretations applies only to statutory interpretations, not
regulatory interpretations), Air Brake Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632, 644 (6th Cir. 2004)
(concluding that “Seminole Rock deference appears to have survived Mead”), Zurich Am. Ins.
Co. v. Whittier Props. Inc., 356 F.3d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004) (post-Mead case citing Auer as the
basis for deferring to an agency’s amicus brief which stated the agency’s interpretation of a regu-
lation), Taylor v. Vt. Dep’t of Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 780 n.7 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that Christen-
sen did not alter the conclusion that the court should grant Seminole Rock deference to an
agency policy letter interpreting an agency regulation), Am. Express Co. v. United States, 262
F.3d 1376, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that Mead did not alter Seminole Rock), and Akzo
Nobel Salt, Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 212 F.3d 1301, 1304 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (limiting Christensen to cases involving agency interpretation of statutes, not agency inter-
pretation of regulations).2011] SEMINOLE ROCK’S DOMAIN 1453
nal rules or presumptions that would limit Seminole Rock’s domain,
and to assess the costs and benefits of these different doctrinal pos-
sibilities.  Our prescriptive objective is to advocate—tentatively—a
subset of these possible rules.  Of these three objectives, the analytic
objective is paramount.  More important than any particular doctrinal
change, is the development of a more sophisticated framework for
thinking about issues of Seminole Rock’s domain, so that these issues
and problems can be confronted squarely and explicitly.
The Article is organized as follows: Part I sketches the evolution
of the Seminole Rock doctrine, focusing on the gradual (and uneven)
transformation in the doctrine’s principal rationale from an emphasis
on an agency’s supposed special insight into the original understand-
ing of its regulations, to a more pragmatic justification that closely
resembles the prevailing rationale for Chevron (both in its pragmatism
and in its invocation of a legal fiction about congressional intent).
Part II discusses how Seminole Rock, coupled with the Administrative
Procedure Act’s (“APA”)21 exemption of interpretive rules from no-
tice-and-comment requirements, creates serious conceptual and prac-
tical difficulties for administrative law doctrine.  In particular, broad
judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations
may enable an agency to enact binding rules without subjecting itself
either to meaningful procedural safeguards or to rigorous judicial
scrutiny.  At the same time, wholesale rejection of Seminole Rock
would be quite disruptive, and would likely have serious disadvan-
tages, including loss of regulatory flexibility and efficiency.  Thus, Part
III—the heart of the Article—explores ways that administrative law
doctrine might circumscribe Seminole Rock’s domain, even while the
core of the doctrine remains intact.  Some of the possible limits on
Seminole Rock are well grounded in the extant caselaw.  Others would
entail extensions or nonobvious modifications of the doctrine, while
still others would require overruling or cabining existing precedent.
With respect to each of these possible limits on Seminole Rock’s do-
main, we strive to present both an evenhanded assessment of costs
and benefits, as well as our own sense of which doctrinal limits ought
to be adopted or preserved, and which ought to be avoided, aban-
doned, or modified.  A brief conclusion offers some final thoughts and
suggests directions for future work on this topic.
21 Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–596, 701–706 (2006).1454 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1449
I. SEMINOLE ROCK’S JUSTIFICATIONS:
FROM ORIGINALISM TO PRAGMATISM
Commentators have complained that Chevron is insufficiently
clear about its underlying rationale,22 but compared to Seminole Rock,
Chevron is a model of thorough and transparent judicial reasoning.
The Seminole Rock Court offered no explanation whatsoever—nor
even a citation to any other authority—for its conclusion that a re-
viewing court must uphold an administrative interpretation of a regu-
lation that is not clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.23  Subsequent judicial decisions invoking Seminole Rock,
though also not always paragons of clarity, have provided somewhat
more explanation.  In particular, these cases have suggested two main
reasons why such strong judicial deference to an agency’s interpreta-
tion of its own regulations might be appropriate.
The first rationale emphasizes the idea that the agency, as the
entity that originally drafted and enacted the regulation in question,
has special insight into its meaning.24  This originalist rationale for
Seminole Rock rests on two assumptions: first, that the agency’s cur-
rent view is likely to accurately capture the agency’s original intent or
understanding of the regulation’s text at the moment of enactment;
and, second, that this original intent or understanding ought to control
subsequent interpretation, even when other indicia (including the
text) tend to point in another direction, or when an alternative inter-
pretation would better fit current circumstances.  Both of these as-
sumptions are questionable, yet much of the early caselaw discussing
Seminole Rock seemed to rest on an originalist rationale,25 and this
justification still occasionally makes an appearance in more recent de-
cisions.26  It is worth highlighting that the originalist justification for
Seminole Rock is inapplicable in the Chevron context because in that
setting, the interpreter (the agency) did not enact the ambiguous text
in question (the statute).27  For this reason, some have concluded that
22 See Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretations of Stat-
utes?: A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1991
WIS. L. REV. 1275, 1281–83.
23 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
24 See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 153 (1991);
Bruh v. Bessemer Venture Partners III L.P., 464 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2006); Gose v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 451 F.3d 831, 837 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Cathedral Candle Co. v. ITC, 400 F.3d 1352, 1363–64
(Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Manning, supra note 8, at 630–31.
25 See F. Uri & Co. v. Bowles, 152 F.2d 713, 718 (9th Cir. 1945); Porter v. Tankar Gas, Inc.,
68 F. Supp. 103, 108, 110 (D. Minn. 1946).
26 See supra note 24.
27 See Manning, supra note 8, at 630.  Some scholars and judges—including Justice Ste-2011] SEMINOLE ROCK’S DOMAIN 1455
Seminole Rock deference ought to be even more robust than Chevron
deference.28
This originalist rationale, if accepted, would have a number of
important ramifications for the scope of the doctrine (that is, for Semi-
nole Rock’s domain).  First, and most obviously, originalist reasoning
would suggest that Seminole Rock deference might not be appropriate
for agency interpretations that are announced long after the promul-
gation of the regulation in question.29  Moreover, Seminole Rock def-
erence might be particularly inappropriate when the agency’s
interpretation has been inconsistent over time, both because the more
recent interpretation provides less insight into the original under-
standing than the earlier interpretation, and because interpretive in-
consistency suggests that the agency never had a clear understanding
of the regulation’s meaning.30  A strong version of the originalist ratio-
nale might even imply that a reviewing court should defer to a con-
temporaneous administrative interpretation even if the court finds the
agency’s later construction of the regulation more textually plausi-
ble.31  Some variants on the originalist rationale might also suggest
vens, the author of the Chevron opinion—have nonetheless suggested analogous logic in the
Chevron context as an additional reason to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a congressional
statute, and to give relatively greater deference to interpretations announced roughly contempo-
raneously with the enactment of the statutory text. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129
S. Ct. 1800, 1826 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  But, by and large, Chevron does not rest on this
sort of originalist reasoning.
28 See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965); Gose, 451 F.3d at 837; Cathedral Candle
Co., 400 F.3d at 1363–64; Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. E.
Associated Coal Corp., 54 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 1995).
29 See Advanta USA, Inc. v. Chao, 350 F.3d 726, 731 (8th Cir. 2003); Porter, 68 F. Supp. at
108; cf. Paragon Health Network, Inc. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 1141, 1146–47 (7th Cir. 2001)
(concluding, based on the court’s rejection of the originalist rationale, that contemporaneity was
not required).
30 See Lal v. INS, 255 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Lars Noah, Divining Regula-
tory Intent: The Place for a “Legislative History” of Agency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 293
(2000) (“[C]ourts that . . . express wariness about inconsistent interpretations may look to the
agency’s original expression of intent as the more reliable contemporaneous explanation of a
regulation.”).
31 See Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entm’t Ctr. at the Waterfront, 193 F.3d 730, 733,
737 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting the Department of Justice’s interpretation of a regulation under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, despite a finding that the interpretation was both “plausible”
and “a rule [that] certainly has much to recommend it,” because the history of the regulation
indicated a different original understanding); cf. Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Leavitt, 509
F.3d 1259, 1273 (10th Cir. 2007) (rejecting agency’s current interpretation because, inter alia, it
conflicted with indicia of the agency’s intent at the time the regulation was enacted); Advanta,
350 F.3d at 730–31 (rejecting agency’s current interpretation in favor of its interpretation at the
time of enactment).1456 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1449
that less deference is due when the agency that interprets the regula-
tion is not the agency that drafted or promulgated the regulation.
In addition to suggesting a range of factors that should affect the
applicability of Seminole Rock deference, the originalist rationale also
suggests that a number of other factors should not have any such ef-
fect.  For instance, on the originalist account of Seminole Rock, it
should not matter whether the agency announces its interpretation of
the regulation in a formal order, in a nonbinding interpretive rule, in a
litigation brief, or in any other form.  Unless there are reasons to sup-
pose that the agency is likely to be more honest in one of these con-
texts compared to another, all of them should provide similar insight
into the agency’s original understanding of its regulation.32  Likewise,
the substantive importance of the interpretive issue would seem to be
of little relevance if the rationale for Seminole Rock deference is the
agency’s special insight into the regulation’s original meaning.
A separate and distinct rationale for Seminole Rock deference
emphasizes not the agency’s alleged special insight into the original
meaning of the regulation, but rather a set of pragmatic considerations
quite similar to those typically invoked to justify Chevron.  Chief
among these is an interest in institutional competence.  Given the
technical complexity of many regulatory schemes and the interdepen-
dence of different individual regulatory provisions, it may make sense
for generalist courts to let the expert agencies resolve any gaps, con-
flicts, or ambiguities in these schemes, so long as the responsible
agency’s resolution is reasonable and consistent with the regulatory
text.33  Similarly, regulatory interpretation, like statutory interpreta-
tion, may implicate political value choices, which might be more ap-
propriately resolved by agencies—as part of the politically
32 See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997) (“There is simply no reason to suspect
that the interpretation [contained in an amicus brief filed by the agency] does not reflect the
agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.”); see also Long Island Care at
Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171 (2007); Reizenstein v. Shinseki, 583 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed.
Cir. 2009); Smith v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1344, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Humanoids Grp. v.
Rogan, 375 F.3d 301, 307 (4th Cir. 2004); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Whittier Props. Inc., 356 F.3d
1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004); Bigelow v. Dep’t of Def., 217 F.3d 875, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
33 See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (“[Seminole Rock] def-
erence is all the more warranted when, as here, the regulation concerns ‘a complex and highly
technical regulatory program,’ in which the identification and classification of relevant ‘criteria
necessarily require[s] significant expertise.’” (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501
U.S. 680, 697 (1991))); see also Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 201
(4th Cir. 2009); Amerada Hess Pipeline Corp. v. FERC, 117 F.3d 596, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Pac.
Coast Med. Enters. v. Harris, 633 F.2d 123, 131 (9th Cir. 1980); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. FERC,
578 F.2d 289, 292 (10th Cir. 1978).2011] SEMINOLE ROCK’S DOMAIN 1457
accountable executive branch—than by politically insulated judges.34
However, these pragmatic arguments, standing alone, cannot justify
Seminole Rock, insofar as blanket deference to an agency’s interpreta-
tion of a legal text would seem to contravene the judiciary’s obligation
to “say what the law is.”35  Thus courts invoking this pragmatic ratio-
nale for Seminole Rock generally deploy—either implicitly or explic-
itly—a legal fiction about congressional intent analogous to the legal
fiction used to justify Chevron: the presumption that when Congress
delegated the agency the authority to make rules with the force of law,
it implicitly delegated to the agency the authority to clarify those rules
with subsequent (reasonable) interpretations that should themselves
be treated by courts as authoritative.36
As between these two justifications for Seminole Rock deference,
the pragmatic justification is ascendant, while the originalist rationale
has been in decline.  When modern courts say anything explicit about
the justification for Seminole Rock (which, admittedly, is rare), they
are more likely to invoke some combination of pragmatic considera-
tions and statements about likely congressional intent (often coupled
with a reference to Chevron as an analog) than they are to invoke the
agency’s privileged insight as the original drafter.37  Moreover, many
of the conclusions about Seminole Rock’s domain that would seem to
flow naturally from the originalist rationale—including the notion that
interpretations issued long after the regulation should receive less def-
erence—are routinely dismissed by courts as irrelevant.38  The death
34 See Pauley, 501 U.S. at 696–97; see also Manning, supra note 8, at 629; Pierce, supra
note 16, at 569–70.
35 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see Manning, supra note 8, at
621; cf. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2075 (characterizing Chevron as a kind of “counter-Marbury”
for the administrative state).
36 See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991)
(“[W]e presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of
the agency’s delegated lawmaking powers.”); see also Bruh v. Bessemer Venture Partners III
L.P., 464 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2006); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 6, at 899.  Scott Angstreich
has advanced a variant on this theme, arguing that Seminole Rock deference is necessary to
make Chevron deference meaningful. See Angstreich, supra note 18, at 112 (“Agencies’ dele-
gated power to interpret ambiguous statutes would be severely compromised if courts did not
defer to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of their regulations.  Therefore, Congress should be
understood to have delegated to agencies the authority to issue binding informal interpretations
of those regulations that implicate Chevron deference in order to give effect to the delegation of
authority to interpret statutes.”).
37 See Bruh, 464 F.3d at 207; S. Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Thompson, 308 F.3d 91, 100 (1st Cir.
2002); Paragon Health Network, Inc. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 1141, 1146–47 (7th Cir. 2001); Para-
lyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
38 See, e.g., United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 566 (1st Cir. 2004); Para-
gon Health Network, 251 F.3d at 1146–47.1458 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1449
of the originalist rationale should not be exaggerated, as originalist
reasoning does sometimes appear in modern cases.39  But as a general
matter, it seems fair to say that the Chevron-like rationale for Semi-
nole Rock—a pragmatic concern about institutional competence, cou-
pled with a legal fiction about implied congressional delegation—is
the dominant modern account of Seminole Rock deference.
The pragmatic rationale for Seminole Rock, however, invites a
number of questions about the proper scope of the doctrine.  Even if
one accepts the basic premises that agencies typically have more ex-
pertise and greater political accountability than do courts, this does
not automatically imply the need for a categorical, across-the-board
rule that courts must uphold any reasonable agency interpretation of a
regulation.  The doctrine could instead adopt a more open-ended and
contingent standard—something akin to Skidmore—that calls for
courts to give weight or respect to an agency’s view, with the degree of
deference perhaps varying with the reviewing court’s sense of how
much the agency’s special expertise informed its interpretive view, as
well as the perceived risk that the agency is behaving inappropri-
ately.40  Alternatively, the doctrine could adopt a set of midlevel prin-
ciples that identify certain types of agency regulatory interpretations
as presumptively entitled to strong Seminole Rock-style deference,
while granting other types of agency interpretations the equivalent of
Skidmore respect, or perhaps subjecting them to de novo review.
Such midlevel principles could themselves be relatively rule-like (for-
mal categories that give courts little discretion) or relatively standard-
like (open-ended factors that judges are supposed to consider when
deciding how much deference is appropriate).  Thus, the pragmatic ra-
tionale for Seminole Rock deference does not lead inexorably to any
particular conclusions regarding the proper scope of Seminole Rock’s
domain, any more than the analogous pragmatic rationale for Chev-
ron deference resolves questions about the proper scope of Chevron’s
domain—a fact vividly illustrated by the acrimonious debates in, and
after, Mead, in which all sides claim fidelity to Chevron.41
39 See Manning, supra note 8, at 630–31.
40 It is perhaps worth noting that even on the originalist account of Seminole Rock, defer-
ence does not automatically imply that courts should uphold any administrative interpretation
that is not clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the text.  Even granting that the agency has
special insight into the regulation’s original meaning, one might still conclude that the agency’s
stated view is only one piece of evidence of that meaning, and that courts should therefore
consider the agency’s view together with other probative evidence (such as the regulatory
history).
41 Compare United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31, 236–38 (2001), with id. at2011] SEMINOLE ROCK’S DOMAIN 1459
Indeed, the implications of the pragmatic rationale for questions
regarding Seminole Rock’s proper domain are even less clear than the
implications of the originalist rationale.  The implications of the prag-
matic rationale turn on the more open-ended normative question of
what institutional regime would be best, rather than on the compara-
tively narrow empirical question of what the agency’s avowed inter-
pretation reveals about the original intent or understanding of the
regulatory text.  For that reason, even a preliminary exploration of
possible limits on Seminole Rock’s domain requires consideration of
the major benefits and costs of judicial deference to an agency’s con-
struction of an administrative regulation.  Part II sketches these gen-
eral normative issues and Part III discusses a range of plausible
doctrinal limits on Seminole Rock.
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF SEMINOLE ROCK:
GOOD GOVERNANCE OR ADMINISTRATIVE
AUTHORITARIANISM?
The main pragmatic arguments in favor of deferring to an
agency’s construction of its own regulation are clear and familiar.
First and foremost, such deference may promote competent and effi-
cient administration of complex government programs.  Agencies, ac-
cording to a widely held and plausible view, often possess technical
expertise that courts lack—both with respect to the subject matter and
how different parts of a complicated regulatory scheme fit together.
Thus if there is doubt about the meaning of a regulation, the court
should accept the agency’s view rather than imposing its own.42  Al-
though it might be preferable for agencies to clarify ambiguous regu-
latory provisions by amending those regulations, this is often
prohibitively cumbersome and time consuming.43  Moreover, some de-
gree of regulatory ambiguity is inevitable, requiring resolution in the
course of implementation.44  Indeed, it might sometimes be desirable
for agencies to build a bit of flexibility into their rules by writing them
in somewhat open-ended terms and fleshing them out as the agency
gains experience with implementing the regulatory program.45  A sec-
239–45 (Scalia, J., dissenting); compare Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003–04 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring), with id. at 1014–20 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
42 See supra note 33.
43 See Hoctor v. USDA, 82 F.3d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1996).
44 See Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 96 (1995); see also Walker Stone Co.
v. Sec’y of Labor, 156 F.3d 1076, 1083 (10th Cir. 1998); Manning, supra note 8, at 616–17.
45 See Walker Stone, 156 F.3d at 1083; Davila-Bardales v. INS, 27 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1994)1460 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1449
ond prominent justification for deferring to an agency’s legal interpre-
tation emphasizes agencies’ comparatively greater political
accountability relative to federal judges.  Although agency officials are
not themselves elected, they are employed by the executive branch
and are overseen to some extent by the White House, and this may
make agencies more politically responsive.46  Agencies also are subject
to congressional oversight, though scholars and judges seem divided
on whether this is a good thing or a bad thing from a political account-
ability perspective.47
These pragmatic arguments for Seminole Rock—expertise, effi-
ciency, flexibility, and accountability—are familiar from the Chevron
context.  Likewise, many of the standard criticisms of Chevron would
apply, mutatis mutandis, to Seminole Rock.  Yet Seminole Rock defer-
ence also raises distinctive concerns that do not apply (or do not apply
with equal force) in the Chevron context.  Two such concerns are par-
ticularly important.  First, as Professor John Manning points out in his
incisive and insightful critique of Seminole Rock, a crucial difference
between Chevron and Seminole Rock is that the former preserves a
separation of legislative and interpretive power, whereas the latter al-
lows these powers to be combined in a single entity.48  Even though
Chevron involves a shift of interpretive power from the judiciary to an
agency, the agency has the power to construe a text that was enacted
by Congress.  By contrast, Seminole Rock allows the agency to act as
the primary interpreter of regulations that the agency itself promul-
gated.  Although the originalist rationale for Seminole Rock invokes
this fact as the principal reason to defer to the agency’s construction,
Professor Manning persuasively argues that this combination of law-
making and law-interpreting functions is actually a reason for serious
concern, one that makes Seminole Rock deference problematic even if
one endorses Chevron.
Seminole Rock’s endorsement of combined lawmaking and inter-
pretive power not only sits in uncomfortable tension with basic consti-
(“Experience is often the best teacher, and agencies retain a substantial measure of freedom to
refine . . . in the light of new insights and changed circumstances.”); see also Manning, supra note
8, at 647, 655.
46 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984);
see also Kagan, supra note 6, at 2373–74; Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators
Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 94–99 (1985).
47 See Manning, supra note 8, at 651, 676–79; John O. McGinnis, Presidential Review as
Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901, 932–38 (2001); Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Na-
tionalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1265–67 (2006).
48 See Manning, supra note 8, at 639.2011] SEMINOLE ROCK’S DOMAIN 1461
tutional commitments,49 but it may also have the perverse effect of
undermining agencies’ incentives to adopt clear regulations.50  Con-
gress knows (or should know) that when it leaves gaps, conflicts, or
ambiguities in a statute, those ambiguities will be resolved by some
other entity—either an administrative agency (under Chevron) or a
court (if no agency administers the statute, or if Chevron does not
apply).  This gives Congress an incentive to write clearer statutes, lest
another institution—perhaps a political rival—acquire control over
the statute’s meaning.  This does not mean that Congress will always
write statutes as clearly as possible: specificity must be weighed
against other values, which is why Congress often delegates authority
in the first place.51  But at least this consideration imposes a counter-
vailing constraint.  By contrast, under Seminole Rock, an administra-
tive agency that writes vague regulations knows that it will be able to
control their subsequent interpretation.  Regulatory ambiguity, unlike
statutory ambiguity, does not entail an implicit delegation to another
institution, which makes such ambiguity relatively more attractive.
This, in turn, leads both to regulatory unpredictability and concerns
about arbitrariness.52
This observation is closely related to a second concern that is spe-
cific to Seminole Rock deference: the worry that Seminole Rock could
enable agencies to adopt legally binding norms without either the ex
ante constraint of meaningful procedural safeguards or the ex post
check of rigorous judicial review.  To understand this concern, it is
important to put it in the context of the APA’s rulemaking provisions.
Under the APA, an agency that wants to adopt a “legislative rule”—a
49 See id. at 631, 639–49.
50 See Anthony, supra note 9, at 12; Manning, supra note 8, at 647–60.
51 See Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, in RESEARCH HAND-
BOOK ON P UBLIC C HOICE AND P UBLIC L AW 285, 286–92 (Daniel A. Ferber & Anne Joseph
O’Connell eds., 2010).
52 See Manning, supra note 8, at 654–56.  There are, however, countervailing considera-
tions that may encourage an agency to draft clear regulations even if the agency can control its
later interpretation.  For instance, as administrations change, agencies evolve with respect to
both personnel and political goals.  Thus, the agency officials who draft an ambiguous regulation
are, in essence, delegating interpretive power to a new entity: the agency as comprised at the
time of interpretation.  To decrease the chance that a subsequent administration will exercise
that discretion contrary to the agency’s current preferences, an agency has an incentive to draft
clear regulations in order to bind subsequent administrations. See id. at 656.  Additionally, one
reason that Congress sometimes chooses to delegate (whether explicitly or via statutory ambigu-
ity) is precisely to ensure that some other entity makes the hard choices and takes the blame.
See Stephenson, supra note 51, at 289–90.  Insofar as this is a substantial explanation for vague-
ness, self-delegations may actually pose less of a problem than do delegations to a different
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rule that binds with the force of law—must comply with the notice-
and-comment process laid out in section 553 (or in some cases the
more rigorous process laid out in sections 556–557).53  The APA, how-
ever, exempts “interpretative rules” and “general statements of pol-
icy” from the ordinary section 553 requirements; interpretive rules
and policy statements (sometimes referred to collectively as “nonlegis-
lative rules”) can be issued without any special procedures (unless
such procedures are imposed by some other statute or by the agency’s
own regulations).54  Courts and commentators have struggled with the
distinction between legislative and nonlegislative rules.55  The main
distinction recognized in the caselaw is that legislative rules have the
force and effect of law, whereas nonlegislative rules do not.56  In other
words, so long as a legislative rule has been validly promulgated, an
agency may seek to enforce that rule against regulated parties; one
can suffer consequences simply for violating the rule.  Nonlegislative
rules lack such binding legal force.57  They either announce in advance
how the agency intends to exercise some general grant of discretion-
ary authority (in the case of policy statements) or how the agency con-
strues some other legally valid directive (in the case of interpretive
rules).  One cannot suffer consequences for violating a nonlegislative
rule: because it lacks legal force, there is nothing to violate.  In an
enforcement proceeding, the agency would have to establish that the
target violated some other norm embodied in a binding statute or
regulation.58
The problem with this “force of law” test, though, is that in many
cases an ostensibly nonlegislative rule can have the de facto force of
law, even if the agency insists that the nonlegislative rule is not in and
of itself legally binding.  If an agency consistently adheres to its non-
53 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556–557 (2006).
54 See id. § 553(b)(3)(A).
55 See Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. FAA, 291 F.3d 49, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (describing
the distinction between legislative and interpretive rules as “less than clear-cut”); Mission Grp.
Kan., Inc. v. Riley, 146 F.3d 775, 781 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that the distinction “is easier to
conceptualize than apply”); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (en banc) (describing this distinction as “enshrouded in considerable smog” (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)); see also Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
1705, 1705 (2007); John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 893–94
(2004).
56 See N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 12 (2d Cir. 1995); Am. Mining Cong. v.
Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed.
Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
57 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 506 F.2d at 38.
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legislative rule when imposing requirements, evaluating permit appli-
cations, levying sanctions, and the like, then the formal status of the
rule may not matter much.  If the agency is not required to comply
with notice-and-comment requirements when promulgating such a
rule, one might fear agencies will circumvent these requirements.
Courts have responded to this concern in two ways.  First, they
sometimes conclude that an agency pronouncement is a legislative
rule, even if it lacks the force of law in a formal sense, if the pro-
nouncement in question appears to bind the agency to an inflexible
policy that exerts a substantial coercive effect on regulated parties.59
However, although these factors may be helpful in distinguishing leg-
islative rules from policy statements, they are of minimal use in distin-
guishing legislative rules from interpretive rules.  As numerous judges
and commentators have pointed out, an interpretive rule’s flexibility
and coercive effect depend principally on the legal text being inter-
preted.60  Moreover, because an interpretive rule is a declaration of
what some other legal command means—and often involves selecting
an interpretation from a relatively constrained set of candidates—a
legal interpretation may often be inflexible (in the sense that it is de-
finitive, rather than tentative and provisional) by its nature.61
Thus, the “force of law” test may not always provide a meaning-
ful restraint on agencies’ ability to avoid notice and comment by
promulgating interpretive rules.  There is, however, a second impor-
tant doctrinal constraint on agencies’ incentive to exploit this exemp-
tion to avoid notice and comment: the principle that courts should
subject the interpretations or policies announced in nonlegislative
rules to more exacting judicial scrutiny.  This principle implies, first,
that when courts conduct “hard look” review under section 706 of the
APA,62 they will take a harder look when reviewing agency policies
announced in nonlegislative rules (though it is not entirely clear
whether courts actually do this).63  More relevant here, this principle
would seem to imply that something like the Mead holding is essen-
tial, notwithstanding the howls of protest in some quarters, lest agen-
cies acquire the power to promulgate binding legal norms (by
59 See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Chamber of
Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
60 See Hoctor v. USDA, 82 F.3d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1996); Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at
1109–11.
61 See Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1110.
62 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
63 See Anthony, supra note 9, at 23–32 (advocating this approach); Stephenson, supra note
17, at 552 (suggesting a rational choice account of why courts might behave this way).1464 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1449
interpreting statutory ambiguities) without having to subject them-
selves to the rigors either of demanding procedural safeguards or of
meaningful judicial review.64  In the statutory interpretation context,
agencies have a choice: they can use notice-and-comment proceedings
to promulgate their statutory interpretations as legislative rules, in
which case they will presumptively receive Chevron deference, or they
can opt to issue these interpretations informally as interpretive rules,
in which case they will have to defend their interpretations under the
less deferential Skidmore standard.  But they have to select one or the
other.  This “pay me now or pay me later” principle has gradually
emerged as a crucial feature of the doctrine, one that allows courts to
avoid direct regulation of agency choice of policymaking form while
retaining some form of meaningful check—either ex ante procedural
safeguards or ex post judicial scrutiny—on administrative decisions.65
An unqualified version of Seminole Rock, however, threatens to
undermine this doctrinal compromise by enabling agencies to issue
binding legal norms while escaping both procedural constraints and
meaningful judicial scrutiny.  This evasion can occur in two related
ways.  First, an agency confronted with a statutory ambiguity might try
to bootstrap its way into the equivalent of Chevron deference by
promulgating a legislative rule that preserves or restates the statutory
ambiguity, and then issuing an interpretive rule that purports to inter-
pret not the statute, but the regulation.  If Seminole Rock is applied in
such cases, it would be quite easy for agencies to circumvent Mead.
Second, unqualified Seminole Rock deference would imply that the
“pay me now or pay me later” compromise would not apply when the
agency interpreted its own regulations.  Even if the legislative rule has
to go through notice and comment, the agency could deliberately draft
this legislative rule broadly and vaguely, and then later resolve all the
controversial points by issuing interpretive rules.  The APA seems to
allow the agency to issue such subsequent interpretations without go-
ing through notice and comment (the agency need not “pay now”),
and an unqualified Seminole Rock doctrine would instruct courts to
uphold those follow-on interpretations so long as they satisfy a mini-
mal reasonableness standard (the agency need not “pay later” either).
64 See Robert A. Anthony & Michael Asimow, The Court’s Deferences—a Foolish Incon-
sistency, 26 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 10, 10 (2000); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 6, at 883–88,
900; Stephenson, supra note 17, at 553–60.
65 See E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1491–92 (1992); see
also Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1111; Stephenson, supra note 17, at 552–53; Sunstein, supra
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Some scholars have concluded that these and other objections to
Seminole Rock imply that courts should abandon the doctrine alto-
gether, replacing it either with a regime of de novo review or with
something resembling Skidmore.66  Courts, however, have consistently
rejected that suggestion,67 and it seems unlikely to gain much traction
in the doctrine.  More importantly, the case for abandoning Seminole
Rock may be overstated.  First, as noted above, there are real and
important advantages to letting agencies clarify the meaning of their
regulatory schemes in the process of implementation.  Second, whole-
sale rejection of Seminole Rock would be a major doctrinal change,
and it is not clear that such drastic action is necessary.68  Furthermore,
although the concerns about Seminole Rock’s effects on agency incen-
tives should not be ignored, they should not be exaggerated either:
under the current regime, agencies still engage in substantial legisla-
tive rulemaking, and these rules are often quite detailed.
The concerns discussed above do, however, suggest problems
with an unqualified version of Seminole Rock—problems that could,
and probably should, be addressed by more modest modifications of
the doctrine.  Indeed, courts have already recognized some important
limits on Seminole Rock, and have hinted at others.69  More generally,
just as Mead explicitly endorsed and elaborated a longstanding incho-
ate sense that Chevron deference made more sense in some contexts
than in others, it may well be that Seminole Rock makes more sense in
some contexts than in others, and courts could translate this intuition
into more concrete doctrinal limits on Seminole Rock’s domain while
leaving the core of the doctrine intact.
If one is sympathetic to this general claim, one must then grapple
with the related but distinct question of what the judicial doctrine on
this issue ought to look like.  The fact that the case for judicial defer-
ence to administrative interpretations is context dependent does not
necessarily imply that judicial deference doctrine ought to be similarly
context dependent.  When courts craft doctrinal tests, they must be
sensitive not only to how well the doctrine corresponds to some un-
derlying normative theory of legal meaning or sound policy, but also
to a number of second-order considerations about the administration
and application of the doctrine, including concerns related to predict-
66 See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 8; Manning, supra note 8.
67 See supra notes 36–37.
68 See Angstreich, supra note 18, at 127; see also Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 142 (2000).
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ability, institutional competence, decision costs, and comparative er-
ror costs.70  Sometimes these considerations favor clear categorical
rules, even though such rules may inevitably be overinclusive, under-
inclusive, or both.  Sometimes an open-ended standard is preferable.
Most often, however, the doctrinal approach is somewhere in the mid-
dle: a set of midlevel presumptions that impose more structure on the
decision than an open-ended, multifactor standard would, but that en-
tail more nuance, and more room for judicial discretion, than a cate-
gorical rule.71  Thus, when considering possible limits on Seminole
Rock’s domain, one must take two dimensions of the inquiry into ac-
count.  The first is the extent to which the proposed limit would ame-
liorate the concerns associated with Seminole Rock without sacrificing
Seminole Rock’s advantages.  The second is whether these substantive
benefits are worth the implementation costs associated with introduc-
ing a new factor into the doctrinal framework.
III. ASSESSING POSSIBLE LIMITS ON SEMINOLE ROCK’S DOMAIN
We now turn to an outline of possible limits on Seminole Rock’s
domain.  We consider four broad forms that such limits might take.
First, we discuss the idea that Seminole Rock deference is inappropri-
ate when the regulation the agency purports to interpret is merely a
placeholder rule that does not sufficiently commit the agency to a par-
ticular position.  Second, we explore the idea that a court should deny
Seminole Rock deference to an agency interpretation that is issued
well after the regulation itself, or that differs from the agency’s own
prior construction of the same regulation.  Third, we consider whether
the  form in which the agency issues its regulatory interpretation
should affect the level of deference.  That is, we pursue the idea that
something like the Mead principle might apply to administrative inter-
pretations of regulations.  Fourth, we address cases in which multiple
agencies are potentially responsible for interpreting the same regula-
tion, and we consider which agency (if any) ought to receive Seminole
Rock deference in such cases.  Within each of these categories, we
provide a brief summary of current doctrine, consider the costs and
benefits of possible limits on Seminole Rock’s domain, and offer our
own tentative conclusions.
70 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword, Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV.
54, 62 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 885, 889 (2003).
71 See Fallon, supra note 70, at 103.2011] SEMINOLE ROCK’S DOMAIN 1467
A. Limits on Regulatory Imprecision: An Antiplaceholder Principle
As noted in Part II, a serious concern about unqualified Seminole
Rock deference is that, when coupled with the interpretive rule ex-
emption from notice-and-comment procedures, agencies can evade
the “pay me now or pay me later” structure of the doctrine by promul-
gating placeholder legislative rules that nominally go through notice
and comment, but do not resolve key questions; the agency does the
actual policymaking work by issuing interpretive rules that purport to
interpret the placeholder rule, and by claiming both Seminole Rock
deference and an exemption from notice and comment for these inter-
pretive pronouncements.  One way to try to impose some constraints
on Seminole Rock’s domain is to set limits on the agency statements
that courts will consider as legitimate interpretations of preexisting
regulations.  That is, courts may treat some ostensible interpretive
rules as doing too much policymaking work to be viewed as mere in-
terpretations of existing regulations.  Indeed, this is probably the most
widely noted type of limit in the extant caselaw: courts have fre-
quently announced—and occasionally enforced—principles that deny
Seminole Rock deference to interpretations of placeholder legislative
rules.72  This approach has appeared in several forms, which differ
somewhat but share common roots in this antiplaceholder principle.
First, when invoking Seminole Rock deference, courts frequently
warn that they will not defer to an agency interpretation when the
underlying regulation is so vague as to be meaningless.  Agencies may
not, in the D.C. Circuit’s vivid formulation, “promulgate mush” and
then ask for deference when issuing interpretive rules purporting to
clarify these mushy regulations.73  If a court concludes that the initial
regulation is too vague—either in general or on some specific point—
for the subsequent nonlegislative rule to qualify as an interpretation,
the court will treat the ostensibly nonlegislative rule as an amendment
to the original rule, which must go through notice and comment in
order to be valid.74
Second, the Supreme Court has made clear that an agency cannot
claim  Seminole Rock deference if the regulation being interpreted
72 See infra notes 73–78 and accompanying text.
73 See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 584, 588 (D.C. Cir.
1997);  see also Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
74 See Mission Grp. Kan., Inc. v. Riley, 146 F.3d 775, 781–83 (10th Cir. 1998) (withholding
Seminole Rock deference because the underlying regulatory language was too vague and
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simply “parrot[s]” the statutory language.75  In such cases, the Court
will treat the interpretive rule not as an interpretation of the regula-
tion, but rather as an interpretation of the statute; from this it follows
that, under Mead, the interpretation (issued without notice and com-
ment) is entitled only to Skidmore respect, not to the more deferential
standard of Chevron or Seminole Rock.76  This antiparroting principle
has a similar form and function to the antimush principle; the main
difference is that the statutory language parroted by the regulation
might not be so vague as to be meaningless.  Nonetheless, both princi-
ples are variants on the idea that courts should not grant Seminole
Rock deference when the regulation being interpreted is a mere
placeholder, either in the sense of having no discernible meaning or in
the sense of replacing some degree of statutory ambiguity with an
equivalent degree of regulatory ambiguity.
A third, and somewhat broader, variant on this principle is evi-
dent in cases where, notwithstanding that the regulation at issue is
neither mush nor a paraphrase of the statute, the court nonetheless
refuses to treat a subsequent agency pronouncement as an interpreta-
tion of the regulation because the alleged interpretive rule cannot be
derived from the regulation through a process of interpretation, as op-
posed to (arbitrary) interstitial policymaking.77  Again, the courts in
these cases seem motivated by a concern that without some doctrinal
limit on agencies’ ability to invoke the interpretive rule exemption
and to receive Seminole Rock deference, they will be able to evade the
“pay me now or pay me later” bargain at the heart of the modern
75 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006).
76 See id. at 256–58, 268; see also Glover v. Standard Fed. Bank, 283 F.3d 953, 962 (8th Cir.
2002) (suggesting that Skidmore deference, rather than Seminole Rock deference, is appropriate
“where the agency regulation does nothing more than mirror the ambiguous language of the
statute”); Cunningham v. Scibana, 259 F.3d 303, 307 n.1 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that if the agency
“simply repeated the statutory language in the regulation,” a subsequent policy statement pur-
porting to interpret that regulation is not entitled to Seminole Rock deference).
77 See Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. FAA, 291 F.3d 49, 55–56 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Mission
Grp. Kan., 146 F.3d at 782–83; Hoctor v. USDA, 82 F.3d 165, 170–71 (7th Cir. 1996); Dir., Office
of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Mangifest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1324–25 (3d Cir.
1987).  In such cases, if the agency disclaims any reliance on the subsequent statement as a bind-
ing source of law, the statement in question might still be considered a nonlegislative rule—a
general statement of policy rather than an interpretive rule.  But that is an important distinction.
As noted above, if a general policy statement is too categorical and inflexible, the court may
insist on treating it as a legislative rule. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.  Thus if the
agency’s pronouncement is categorical and inflexible, the agency may need to classify the pro-
nouncement as an interpretive rule rather than as a general policy statement if it hopes to qualify
for the nonlegislative rule exemption from notice-and-comment requirements.2011] SEMINOLE ROCK’S DOMAIN 1469
doctrine by enacting placeholder regulations and doing the real poli-
cymaking work in subsequent so-called interpretations.78
The antiplaceholder principle, in all its variations, has a great deal
of intuitive appeal.  After all, it directly attacks the most salient con-
cern about Seminole Rock—circumvention of meaningful ex ante or
ex post constraints on significant agency policy decisions—while at the
same time preserving Seminole Rock deference for interstitial admin-
istrative interpretations that resolve the myriad smaller issues that in-
evitably arise when an agency implements a complex regulatory
scheme.  That said, the antiplaceholder principle—in all its forms—is
extremely difficult to administer effectively.  This principle, at bottom,
requires judges both to assess how much interpretive or policymaking
work is being done by the legislative rule relative to the interpretive
rule, and to develop a normative standard for how much interpretive
work is too much.  Both of these tasks are extremely difficult and do
not lend themselves to easy-to-articulate doctrinal formulations.
There may be some easy cases, as when a regulation really does
say nothing at all (for example, by announcing that regulated entities
must behave “appropriately”), or literally replicates, word for word, a
statutory provision.  But such cases are rare.  The more common situa-
tion is one in which an agency with broad discretion promulgates a
legislative rule that narrows that discretion somewhat, but still leaves
substantial ambiguities, and a subsequent interpretive rule that nar-
rows that discretion further by resolving some of the ambiguities in
the legislative rule.  In such cases, judicial attempts to differentiate
those agency pronouncements that legitimately interpret prior legisla-
tive rules from those that illegitimately promulgate new policies are
likely to be subjective and unpredictable.  All regulations are at least
somewhat open ended.  What, then, counts as “mush”?  Many regula-
tions that interpret statutes do not use identical language, but do use
similar language or alternate phrasings.79  When, then, is the agency
guilty of “parroting”?80  More generally, where does interpretation
end and policymaking begin?
These problems are familiar from other contexts in which courts
have tried, but mostly failed, to impose requirements related to how
closely a legally authoritative pronouncement must follow from a
prior legal pronouncement.  Most notably, the Supreme Court has
78 See Mission Grp. Kan., 146 F.3d at 782.
79 See, e.g., Plateau Mining Corp. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 519 F.3d
1176, 1192–93 (10th Cir. 2008).
80 Compare Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 257, with id. at 278–80 (Scalia, J., dissenting).1470 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1449
consistently declared that Article I of the Federal Constitution81 pre-
cludes delegation of legislative power to administrative agencies, but
the Court has just as consistently failed to translate that view into any
meaningful constitutional constraint on Congress’s ability to grant
policymaking authority to agencies.82  The doctrine nominally requires
organic statutes to contain an “intelligible principle” to guide and con-
strain agency discretion;83 in practice, virtually anything—even vague
“public interest” language—is enough to satisfy this requirement.84
Despite the intuitive appeal of the idea that Congress must make the
key choices while the agency can fill in the details, courts have strug-
gled with—and seemingly given up on—the project of differentiating
key choices from details of implementation.
A similar phenomenon is evident in the Court’s jurisprudence on
agencies’ freedom to make general policy choices through adjudica-
tion rather than through rulemaking.  Courts have sometimes ex-
pressed concern about agencies relying overmuch on adjudication,
and some prominent judges and justices have tried to insist that cer-
tain kinds of general decisions must be made through rulemaking.85
But the Supreme Court has consistently rejected that suggestion, in
part because of the difficulty of deciding how specific a preexisting
statutory or regulatory command must be before an agency can prop-
erly give it more definite content in an individualized adjudication.86
The antiplaceholder principle confronts a similar difficulty.  Per-
haps for this reason, judicial articulations and applications of the an-
tiplaceholder principle (with only a handful of exceptions) have
focused on the rare extreme cases.87  Our sense is that, although the
antiplaceholder principle is desirable, limiting this principle to ex-
treme cases is also advisable.  A more expansive version of the princi-
ple would be too difficult to apply consistently, and would therefore
be too unpredictable.  Thus, we think that courts have probably gotten
81 U.S. CONST. art. I.
82 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 318–19 (2000).
83 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); J.W. Hampton, Jr., &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
84 See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474.
85 See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969) (plurality opinion); id. at
777–78 (Douglas, J., dissenting); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 215–17 (1947) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting); Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 495–96 (2d. Cir. 1973), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
86 See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 293–95 (1974); Chenery, 322 U.S. at
202–03.
87 See, e.g., supra notes 73–78 and accompanying text.2011] SEMINOLE ROCK’S DOMAIN 1471
the doctrine right with respect to the family of antiplaceholder princi-
ples (though we might quibble with individual applications).
That said, it is important to recognize that the more limited ver-
sion of the antiplaceholder principle evident in the extant caselaw is of
only modest use in constraining abuses of Seminole Rock deference.
Courts do not always seem sufficiently sensitive to this fact; some
opinions appear to suggest that the prohibition on agencies’ promul-
gating mush means that, so long as the agency rule is not so vague as
to be meaningless, applying Seminole Rock deference is un-
problematic.88  But this does not follow.  Again, the analogy to the
Article I nondelegation doctrine is instructive.  Although courts have
concluded that a constitutional nondelegation doctrine is unenforce-
able,89 the concern about excessive delegation has inspired a range of
other types of doctrinal constraints on agency freedom of action.90  In
the Seminole Rock context, the antiplaceholder principle is a kind of
anti-self-delegation doctrine, but it too has proved mostly unenforce-
able except in rare extreme cases.91  In light of that fact, it is important
to consider other possible doctrinal techniques for addressing con-
cerns about excessive self-delegation, rather than merely invoking the
anti-self-delegation principle as if it rendered the problem moot.
Thus, although we generally endorse the family of antiplaceholder
principles evident in the current caselaw, these principles should be
viewed as relatively weak, and they should not be characterized as
carrying more weight than they actually do or can.92
88 See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
89 See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
90 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 82.
91 See, e.g., supra notes 73–78 and accompanying text.
92 One other potential limitation on Seminole Rock’s domain, related to the an-
tiplaceholder principle, may be worth touching upon here as well: the possibility that some inter-
pretive issues are simply too important for courts to defer to the agency.  Such a possibility has
an analog in the Chevron context, as some courts and scholars have suggested the possibility of a
“major questions” exception to Chevron. See Moncrieff, supra note 15; Sunstein, supra note 7,
at 231–34.  In the Chevron context, the idea is that for such major questions, it is implausible that
Congress would have wanted to delegate interpretive (and therefore lawmaking) authority to
the agency rather than to the judiciary.  The analogous argument in the Seminole Rock context
would be that for sufficiently major questions of regulatory interpretation, it is implausible that
Congress would have wanted to delegate to the agency, rather than to the judiciary, the power to
resolve regulatory ambiguities.
This Article does not treat this issue in depth, both because the arguments for this limitation
on deference would seem to be roughly the same in both contexts (and therefore a discussion
would not add much to the current literature on the topic, even though the extant literature
focuses on Chevron), and because questions of regulatory interpretation rarely rise to the level
of “major” questions without also implicating one of the other antiplaceholder principles dis-
cussed above (meaning that further discussion would likely be redundant).  To put this latter1472 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1449
B. Limitations Related to Timing and Consistency
Recall that under an originalist understanding of Seminole Rock,
noncontemporaneous interpretations are presumptively less entitled
to deference, and noncontemporaneous interpretations that are incon-
sistent with prior interpretations have even less of a claim to defer-
ence.93  Under the more pragmatic, Chevron-esque rationale for
Seminole Rock, these conclusions do not necessarily follow.  On a
pragmatic account of Seminole Rock, should it matter whether an
agency’s interpretation of a regulation was issued shortly after the reg-
ulation itself, as opposed to years or decades later?  Should it matter
whether the agency has consistently adhered to the same interpreta-
tion of the regulatory text?
Consider first the issue of contemporaneous versus noncon-
temporaneous agency interpretations of a regulation.  Again, an
originalist rationale would treat this distinction as highly significant, as
a contemporaneous interpretation is (arguably) more likely to reflect
the agency’s original intent at the moment of enactment.  By contrast,
under the pragmatic rationale—which stresses comparative expertise
and accountability—the fact that an interpretation is issued well after
the enactment of the regulation is probably not a reason to withhold
deference, just as a noncontemporaneous agency interpretation of a
statute is generally not thought to be outside of Chevron’s domain.94
Indeed, consistent with the ascendance of the pragmatic rationale for
Seminole Rock, most modern cases reject the notion that an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation is due less deference simply be-
cause it was issued well after the regulation itself,95 and those cases
that do suggest a problem with noncontemporaneous interpretations
seem to rely on the increasingly atavistic originalist rationale.96
One might go even further and suggest that in light of the main
arguments for and against Seminole Rock, a regulatory interpretation
point another way, in most imaginable cases in which a court might invoke a “major questions”
exception to Seminole Rock, the court could frame essentially the same argument in terms of the
original regulation failing adequately to address the major issue (promulgating mush) or ad-
dressing it only by copying the statutory language (parroting).  The advantages and disadvan-
tages of a “major questions” limit on Seminole Rock would therefore parallel the earlier
arguments.
93 See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
94 See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996).
95 See, e.g., Paragon Health Network, Inc. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 1141, 1146–47 (7th Cir.
2001).
96 See Advanta USA, Inc. v. Chao, 350 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 2003); Porter v. Tankar Gas,
Inc., 68 F. Supp. 103, 108 (D. Minn. 1946); cf. Paragon, 251 F.3d at 1146–47.2011] SEMINOLE ROCK’S DOMAIN 1473
issued very shortly after the regulation itself should be less entitled to
deference than an interpretation issued many years later.  The ratio-
nale for this counterintuitive conclusion goes as follows.  The main
objection to Seminole Rock, discussed in Part II, focuses on the self-
delegation problem: the concern is that agencies will take advantage
of the combination of Seminole Rock deference and the APA’s inter-
pretive rule exemption by enacting vague, open-ended legislative rules
that the agency can then translate into real obligations through subse-
quent interpretations.  A significant time lag between the enactment
of the legislative rule and the interpretive rule may mitigate the sever-
ity of the self-delegation concern, for two reasons.
First, the time lag suggests that the agency was not gaming the
system by deliberately avoiding coverage of a controversial issue in
the regulation itself.  It is much more plausible, in the case of a long
time lag, that the interpretive rule was issued in response to a genu-
inely new issue or problem that was not foreseen when the agency
drafted the legislative rule.  Second, an agency’s incentive to delegate
to itself is stronger in the short term than the long term because
agency preferences tend to change over time—especially, though not
exclusively, following changes in partisan control of the White House.
Characterizing a vague agency rule as an act of self-delegation may be
misleading when the subsequent interpretation takes place years later
by an agency headed by administrators of a different political party;
indeed, the agency enacting the regulation may be just as concerned
about delegating to its successors as Congress may be about delegat-
ing to an agency.97
For these reasons, we do not think that a later agency interpreta-
tion should be any less entitled to Seminole Rock deference than a
contemporaneous interpretation, and we agree with the thrust of most
of the recent caselaw that treats this difference in timing as irrele-
vant.98  As for the possibility of giving less deference to interpretations
that are issued very shortly after the regulation itself, we think that
such a possibility—though lacking any support in the extant caselaw—
is certainly plausible.  Indeed, it seems more plausible than the
originalist practice of giving more deference to contemporaneous in-
terpretations than to later interpretations.
Nonetheless, explicitly incorporating that sort of consideration
into the doctrine would likely create severe administrability problems.
Deciding which interpretations were promulgated too close in time to
97 See supra note 52.
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the original legislative rule to merit ordinary Seminole Rock deference
would require highly subjective judgment calls, and although one
could deal with this by adopting a clear cut-off rule (say, a fixed num-
ber of months or an intervening presidential election), that approach
would likely seem excessively arbitrary.  Moreover, one should not
neglect the possibility that even agencies that act in good faith may
have sound reasons for promulgating a large number of interpretive
rules shortly after a legislative rule is enacted, as the adoption and
initial implementation of a new rule may naturally generate a large
number of questions that require immediate clarification, even if the
agency tried conscientiously to make the rule itself thorough and com-
prehensive.99  It might be unwise to discourage agencies from provid-
ing such clarifications promptly.  For these reasons, our tentative
conclusion is that the doctrine should continue to treat the timing of
the issuance of the agency’s interpretive rule as irrelevant to the level
of judicial deference.  Near-contemporaneous regulatory interpreta-
tions certainly should not be entitled to any more deference than later
interpretations, and they probably should not get any less deference
either.
The relevance of interpretive inconsistency to Seminole Rock def-
erence under the pragmatic rationale presents a more difficult prob-
lem.  The doctrine on this point is unsettled, which is probably
unsurprising given that the Supreme Court has also sent mixed signals
about whether an agency is entitled to Chevron deference when the
agency’s interpretation of the same statutory provision changes over
time. Chevron itself seems to say that inconsistency is not a reason to
withhold full Chevron deference from the prevailing interpretation.100
The most recent Supreme Court case on the subject, National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, embraced
that position.101  Yet a persistent strain in the Supreme Court caselaw
since Chevron has suggested that less deference is due to inconsistent
interpretations,102 and there are even some post-Brand X circuit court
cases that continue to adopt that view.103  In the Seminole Rock con-
99 See Strauss, supra note 18, at 805–06.
100 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984);
accord Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
101 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
102 See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994); Good Samaritan Hosp.
v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417–18 (1993); Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S 680, 698
(1991); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987).
103 See Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2010); Natural Res. Def. Council v.
EPA, 526 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 919–20,2011] SEMINOLE ROCK’S DOMAIN 1475
text, courts have likewise sent mixed signals on the relevance of inter-
pretive inconsistency.104  One can observe in the doctrine two related
but distinct versions of this skepticism toward inconsistent regulatory
interpretations, one weaker and one stronger.
The weaker version, applied in many circuit court cases105 and
endorsed in at least some Supreme Court opinions,106 suggests that
when an agency changes its interpretation of an ambiguous regulatory
provision, the court should employ a less deferential standard of re-
view—perhaps de novo review, or perhaps something closer to Skid-
more.  The stronger version—originally developed by the D.C.
Circuit107 and later adopted in other circuits as well108—treats the
agency’s original interpretation of its ambiguous regulation as having
fixed the regulation’s meaning, such that any later inconsistent inter-
pretation is actually an amendment to the regulation, which is invalid
unless it goes through notice and comment.  This is so even if the
agency’s later interpretation would have been upheld under Seminole
Rock if the agency had adopted it in the first instance.109  The agency
thus gets “one bite at the apple.”  It can claim Seminole Rock defer-
ence for its first interpretation, but not for subsequent interpretations
of the same provision.  Are either of these limits on Seminole Rock’s
domain justified?
Begin with the strong version.  Although our focus, and the thrust
of most of the modern caselaw, is on the Chevron-like pragmatic ra-
tionale for Seminole Rock deference, it seems that the D.C. Circuit’s
strong version of the “one bite” principle is grounded in one or both
of two theories that are inconsistent with that pragmatic rationale.
The first possible theory is the originalist theory of Seminole Rock—
the idea that the earliest interpretation is most likely to reflect the
intent of the agency when it promulgated the regulation, and that later
interpretations are not really evidence of the regulation’s original in-
920 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (asserting that although Brand X makes clear that the Chevron frame-
work applies even to inconsistent agency interpretations, inconsistency is a factor that may indi-
cate the agency’s interpretation is unreasonable).
104 Compare S. Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Thompson, 308 F.3d 91, 102 (1st Cir. 2002), with Para-
lyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 586–87.
105 See Advanta USA, Inc. v. Chao, 350 F.3d 726, 730–31 (8th Cir. 2003); Cmty. Hosp. of
the Monterey Peninsula v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 782, 792 (9th Cir. 2003); S. Shore Hosp., Inc., 308
F.3d at 102.
106 See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 515.
107 See Alaska Prof’l Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Syncor
Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94–95 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 586.
108 See Shell Offshore Inc. v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622, 629 (5th Cir. 2001).
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tent, but rather an indication that the agency has decided to change
the regulation.110  The second possible theory for the strong “one bite”
rule is a particular philosophical understanding of legal ambiguity and
its resolution.  On that view, although a legal text may originally be
unclear, once an authoritative interpreter determines the text’s mean-
ing, that meaning is settled by the act of interpretation.111
There is another possible understanding of ambiguity and inter-
pretation, however.  On this alternate view, an ambiguous text does
not have a single correct meaning; rather, an ambiguous text opens up
a zone of policy discretion.  Under this view, the interpreter is in fact
making a discretionary policy judgment, and the fact that the inter-
preter makes a particular judgment does not mean that the text is no
longer ambiguous.  Rather, the text remains ambiguous, and the inter-
pretation is merely provisional.  The Chevron line of cases, and Brand
X in particular, embraces that latter account: agency (or judicial) in-
terpretations of ambiguous statutes do not settle the statute’s mean-
ing.  Rather, the interpretation merely reflects the selection of one
possible choice out of the discretionary range created by the statutory
ambiguity.112  Thus the conceptual foundations of the D.C. Circuit’s
strong “one bite” rule are rather tenuous: the rule seems to rest either
on a conception of interpretation that clashes with prevailing under-
standings of Chevron or on a waning originalist rationale for Seminole
Rock.
What of the weaker version: the idea that an inconsistent agency
interpretation may still be upheld, but is entitled to something less
than full Seminole Rock deference?  When invoking this principle,
courts often simply assert that interpretive inconsistency is a reason to
withhold deference without explaining why.113  When they do offer an
explanation, it usually takes one of two forms.  First, as was true with
the strong “one bite” principle, courts sometimes revert to originalist
reasoning, notwithstanding their rejection of the originalist rationale’s
implications in other contexts.114  Second, courts sometimes rely, with-
110 See Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 212 F.3d 1301,
1304–05 (D.C. Cir. 2000); F. Uri & Co. v. Bowles, 152 F.2d 713, 715–19 (9th Cir. 1945).
111 See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text.
112 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981,
983–84 (2005). See generally Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibil-
ity in Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272 (2002); E. Donald Elliott, Chevron
Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress, Courts and Agencies in
Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2005); Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule,
Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009).
113 See supra notes 102–03.
114 See Advanta USA, Inc. v. Chao, 350 F.3d 726, 730–31 (8th Cir. 2003).2011] SEMINOLE ROCK’S DOMAIN 1477
out much explanation, on the caselaw from the analogous Chevron
context and cite Supreme Court precedents in which the Court indi-
cated that full Chevron deference is inappropriate when an agency’s
interpretation of the same statutory provision has changed over
time.115  This is problematic, however—not so much because the con-
text is different (though it may be), but because these Supreme Court
precedents withholding deference to inconsistent agency statutory in-
terpretations have been rejected (sometimes in quite strong terms) by
subsequent decisions, most notably Brand X.116  If the case for with-
holding Seminole Rock deference from inconsistent regulatory inter-
pretations rests on the analogous authority of cases treating
inconsistent statutory interpretations as unworthy of full Chevron def-
erence, but those latter statutory cases have been superseded by more
recent decisions that reaffirm the irrelevance of interpretive inconsis-
tency in the statutory context, then it would seem that the doctrinal
foundations for such a limit on Seminole Rock’s domain have been
undermined.
Thus there are serious problems with the conventional explana-
tions offered by courts for both the strong and weak versions of the
principle that inconsistent regulatory interpretations are outside of
Seminole Rock’s domain.  Yet the great virtue (and vice) of the “im-
plied or fictitious congressional intent” rationale for both Chevron
and Seminole Rock is its flexibility.  If there are good reasons to place
subsequent inconsistent interpretations outside Seminole Rock’s do-
main, then one can always assert that this limitation was implicit in
Congress’s delegation of regulatory power to the agency: it is what
Congress (implicitly) wanted, or would have wanted if it had consid-
ered the matter, or at least what we should stipulate Congress wanted
until it says otherwise.117  The only way to make the choice, under this
pragmatic rationale, is to consider the likely effects of the different
rules, and to determine which is normatively most attractive.  Unfor-
tunately, assessing the likely consequences of a consistency-based
115 See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994) (stating that a regula-
tory interpretation that conflicts with a prior interpretation is “entitled to considerably less def-
erence than a consistently held agency view” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cmty. Hosp.
of the Monterey Peninsula v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 782, 792 (9th Cir. 2003); S. Shore Hosp., Inc. v.
Thompson, 308 F.3d 91, 102 (1st Cir. 2002).
116 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982–83 (“Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute
unambiguously forecloses the agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the
agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction.”).
117 See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997).1478 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1449
limit on Seminole Rock’s domain is extremely difficult, and a norma-
tive evaluation of these consequences is more difficult still.
On the one hand, a rule that gives less deference to subsequent
inconsistent interpretations would mitigate an agency’s incentive to
leave key issues permanently undecided.  Although an agency could
buy itself some additional flexibility by leaving an issue unsettled in
the original legislative rule, that flexibility dissolves once the agency
addresses the question.  This has the further desirable effect of making
agency rules, and their application, more predictable.  Additionally,
the possibility that agency preferences may change over time may give
agencies an incentive to identify and resolve interpretive ambiguities
earlier rather than later, which may itself be beneficial.  It is also pos-
sible that granting less deference to subsequent, inconsistent interpre-
tations gives the agency an incentive to make its initial interpretation
somewhat more (ideologically) moderate, which can be desirable
under certain assumptions about majoritarian preferences.118
On the other hand, deferring less to a subsequent inconsistent
interpretation may give the first interpreter an undue advantage.  In-
deed, if the main concern about Seminole Rock deference is the self-
delegation problem,119 then the first interpreter is the one we should
be most worried about.  If subsequent interpretations get the same
level of Seminole Rock deference as the initial interpretation, then the
officials who draft the regulation know that although they can resolve
regulatory ambiguities in a way that they like, once the agency leader-
ship changes, these interpretations may be changed in ways that
promulgating agency officials dislike.  That intertemporal variation in
agency preferences, when coupled with deference even to inconsistent
interpretations, may give the promulgating agency a stronger incen-
tive to issue a clearer legislative rule.  And, of course, giving less def-
erence to subsequent inconsistent interpretations may undermine
some of the pragmatic advantages associated with Seminole Rock, in
particular the ability to respond flexibly to new information and
changing circumstances, as well as responsiveness to the political pref-
erences of current electoral majorities.
Although the question is close, these latter considerations per-
suade us that the consistency of an agency’s regulatory interpretation
ought to be irrelevant to the applicability of Seminole Rock deference.
Although giving only limited deference to subsequent inconsistent in-
118 See Yehonatan Givati & Matthew C. Stephenson, Judicial Deference to Inconsistent
Agency Statutory Interpretations, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 86 (2011).
119 See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.2011] SEMINOLE ROCK’S DOMAIN 1479
terpretations may seem like an attractive way to preserve the core of
Seminole Rock while addressing the self-delegation concern, in fact
this approach may have the opposite effect—denying Seminole Rock
deference in those cases where it is arguably most appropriate (when
an agency wants to revise its interpretation in response to new circum-
stances) while strengthening rather than weakening the rulemaking
agency’s incentive to self-delegate (by removing, or at least weaken-
ing, concerns about delegating power to a future political rival).  This
latter concern, of course, does not exist (at least not in the same way)
in the Chevron context, though most of the other considerations in
both directions do.  This implies that the pragmatic argument for de-
ferring less to a subsequent inconsistent interpretation would be
stronger in the Chevron context than in the Seminole Rock context.  It
is thus somewhat ironic—perhaps even perverse—that although the
Supreme Court seems to have finally rejected the idea that inconsis-
tency matters for Chevron, the Court and numerous courts of appeal
have continued to suggest that inconsistency may undercut the case
for Seminole Rock.
Yet a third issue regarding the timing and consistency of an
agency’s interpretation of its regulation has to do with retroactivity.
What if an agency seeks to penalize a regulated entity on the basis of a
regulatory interpretation that, although plausible, is not obviously the
best or most natural interpretation of the regulatory text, or that con-
tradicts the agency’s own prior interpretation of the regulation?  This
retroactivity issue also may arise when an agency seeks to impose a
sanction on the basis of a statutory interpretation.  In that context,
courts apply a balancing test in which factors such as the nature of the
sanction, whether the agency is contradicting its own prior interpreta-
tion, and the strength of the agency’s interest in applying the interpre-
tation retroactively are all considered as factors in the more general
inquiry into whether the agency’s decision to apply its interpretation
retroactively is arbitrary and capricious.120  Some lower courts have
suggested, however, that the test for retroactivity may be more strin-
gent in the context of regulatory (as opposed to statutory) interpreta-
tion.121  These decisions have indicated that even if an agency’s
120 See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947); Dist. Lodge 64, Int’l Ass’n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 949 F.2d 441, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Retail, Whole-
sale & Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
121 See, e.g., Ga. Pac. Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 25 F.3d 999,
1005–06 (11th Cir. 1994); Rollins Envtl. Servs. (NJ) Inc. v. EPA, 937 F.2d 649, 652–54 (D.C. Cir.
1991); Satellite Broad. Co. v. FCC, 824 F.2d 1, 3–4 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Maxcell Telecom Plus, Inc.
v. FCC, 815 F.2d 1551, 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Kropp Forge Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 657 F. 2d 119,1480 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1449
regulatory interpretation is entitled to Seminole Rock deference, that
interpretation may not be invoked to impose a civil penalty or to cut
off a party’s right if the underlying legislative rule was sufficiently am-
biguous and the subsequent interpretation was sufficiently novel and
unexpected.122  Extrapolating a bit on the reasoning of these decisions,
one might postulate a rule that says courts should apply something
less than Seminole Rock deference (either de novo review or some-
thing like Skidmore respect) when an agency seeks to impose a pen-
alty or to cut off a party’s right, unless the regulatory interpretation
had been announced previously.
This more stringent retroactivity limitation on Seminole Rock’s
domain has much to recommend it.  Although it does not do much
about the self-delegation concern, it does address the distinct and re-
lated concern that Seminole Rock may undermine fair notice (espe-
cially if Seminole Rock exacerbates agencies’ incentives to write vague
regulations).  Such a rule would likely give agencies stronger incen-
tives to announce more of their regulatory interpretations ahead of
time—in guidance manuals or ruling letters—rather than waiting until
individual enforcement actions.
That said, there are at least two main drawbacks to enforcing a
more stringent retroactivity limit in the regulatory interpretation con-
text than in the statutory interpretation context.  First, as in the statu-
tory context, agencies may not be able to anticipate all the conduct
that should fall within the scope of regulatory language, and prohibit-
ing them from applying their regulatory interpretations retroactively
may enable too many regulatory targets to exploit loopholes or ambi-
guities in regulatory language.  This is essentially the same concern
that has led courts to use a balancing test, rather than a strict prohibi-
tion, when evaluating retroactive application of statutory interpreta-
tions.123  Second, a strict prohibition on retroactivity may give
regulated parties an incentive to act quickly, without consulting the
agency, on the logic that advance consultation may subject the regu-
lated party to more constraints.124
123–24 (7th Cir. 1981); Dravo Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 613 F.2d
1227, 1232 (3d Cir. 1980); Diamond Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm’n, 528 F.2d 645, 649–50 (5th Cir. 1976); Radio Athens, Inc. v. FCC, 401 F.2d 398, 404
(D.C. Cir. 1968); see also Manning, supra note 8, at 670 & n.281.
122 See, e.g., Ga. Pac. Corp., 25 F.3d at 1005–06.
123 See Chenery, 332 U.S. at 203.
124 See Yehonatan Givati, The Optimal Structure of Administrative Policymaking:
Rulemaking, Adjudication, Licensing and Advance Ruling 2 (2011) (unpublished manuscript)
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These drawbacks are real, but our tentative view is that it makes
sense to withhold Seminole Rock deference in those cases where, due
to the lack of advance notice, deferring to the agency’s interpretation
would give rise to a retroactivity problem.  Although it is true that
Congress sometimes empowers agencies to act through adjudication,
under only vague and open-ended statutory criteria, the calculus
should be somewhat different when the agency is, in effect, delegating
authority to itself.  Where Congress has established a system in which
the agency lacks the power to act until it first promulgates a valid set
of legislative rules, it is usually reasonable to suppose that Congress
intends for those rules (and their interpretation) to be knowable in
advance.  And a more stringent antiretroactivity principle gives agen-
cies a stronger incentive to draft clearer regulations in the first place—
addressing a self-delegation concern that, as noted earlier, does not
exist (at least not in the same way) in the statutory interpretation
context.
Thus, at least with respect to timing issues, we think that the cur-
rent doctrine generally adopts the right approach, though not entirely
or consistently so.  We would advocate few timing-related constraints
on Seminole Rock’s domain: courts should probably not treat as signif-
icant whether the agency interpretation was announced soon or long
after the underlying legislative rule, or whether the agency’s interpre-
tation is consistent with its own prior interpretations.  Indeed, al-
though the originalist rationale for Seminole Rock implied that
Seminole Rock might not be appropriate for noncontemporaneous or
inconsistent interpretations, under the pragmatic rationale for Semi-
nole Rock we suggest that contemporaneous interpretations are, if an-
ything, less worthy of deference.  Furthermore, the case for deferring
to inconsistent agency interpretations is probably stronger in the Semi-
nole Rock context than in the Chevron context.  In our view, the only
timing-related limitation on Seminole Rock’s domain that courts
ought to retain, or even strengthen, is the limitation on retroactive
application of nonobvious regulatory interpretations.  This limitation
not only addresses the fair notice concern but also mitigates the incen-
tive that Seminole Rock tends to create for agencies to promulgate
vague regulations.
C. Form Limitations: A Mead Doctrine for Seminole Rock?
As the caselaw on judicial review of administrative statutory in-
terpretation has long recognized—and as Mead emphasized—agen-
cies promulgate their views of statutory meaning in a wide variety of1482 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1449
forms.  Sometimes an agency will declare its interpretation of a statute
in the text of a legislative rule, promulgated pursuant to notice-and-
comment procedures (or something more).125  Sometimes an agency
will announce its construction of a statute when issuing an order fol-
lowing a formal administrative adjudication, with the full panoply of
procedural safeguards associated with that process.126  In other cases,
an agency will indicate its views regarding the meaning of a statutory
provision in a less formal adjudicative proceeding, with fewer safe-
guards.127  An agency may also state its position on the meaning of a
statute in an interpretive rule, perhaps a general guidance document128
or a letter or memorandum directed to a particular party.129  Some-
times agency interpretations announced in adjudicative orders or non-
binding interpretive statements are carefully vetted and endorsed by
senior agency officials; other times, these interpretive positions are an-
nounced by lower-level officials, with minimal (or purely pro forma)
review by the agency leadership.130  And there are also cases in which
an agency does not announce its statutory construction until the issue
arises in litigation, at which point the agency may set forth its interpre-
tive view in a brief, either as a party in interest or as an amicus
curiae.131
Mead not only recognized this procedural variety, but embraced
the longstanding—though controversial—position that the procedural
form in which an agency promulgates its statutory construction mat-
ters for the level of judicial deference.  Though Mead eschewed hard-
and-fast rules,132 it established a strong presumption that agency statu-
125 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(reviewing a notice-and-comment rule that interpreted a provision of the Clean Air Act).
126 See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999) (reviewing an agency order, issued
pursuant to a formal adjudication, that interpreted a provision of the Immigration and National-
ity Act).
127 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (reviewing a Customs Service
ruling letter on the proper tariff classification of certain imported goods); Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 653–56 (1990) (reviewing an order, issued pursuant to an
informal adjudication, that interpreted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act).
128 See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (reviewing a general
agency statement on the proper interpretation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
129 See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (reviewing a Department of
Labor opinion letter on the meaning of a provision in the Fair Labor Standards Act).
130 See, e.g., Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 181–82 (3d
Cir. 1995) (reviewing an interpretation of the Social Security Act promulgated by the Director of
the Medicaid Bureau of the Health Care Financing Administration); see also Mead, 533 U.S. at
233 (noting that thousands of Customs Service ruling letters are issued each year by relatively
low-level officials at forty-six different ports of entry).
131 See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 209 (1988).
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tory interpretations announced in certain forms—particularly notice-
and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication—are presump-
tively entitled to Chevron deference, whereas interpretations an-
nounced in other forms—such as informal orders, interpretive rules,
and litigation briefs—presumptively are not.133 Mead rationalized this
set of presumptions by reference to the “presumed congressional in-
tent” rationale for Chevron.134  Scholarly commentary has defended
and criticized Mead’s emphasis on procedural formality as the touch-
stone for Chevron deference,135 and both the commentary and the
caselaw have suggested other procedural or quasi-procedural factors
(such as timing and hierarchy) that courts ought to consider when de-
ciding whether to apply Chevron.136
Perhaps surprisingly, less attention has been paid to the fact that
agency interpretations of regulations may also appear in a wide vari-
ety of forms.  Of course, in contrast to statutory interpretation, an
agency would never issue an interpretation of its own regulations in a
legislative rule.  If it did, then the agency’s pronouncement would be
an amendment of the regulation, rather than a mere interpretation.
But other than that difference, administrative interpretations of regu-
lations exhibit as much variety with respect to policymaking form as
do administrative interpretations of statutes.  Agencies announce reg-
ulatory interpretations in orders following full-blown formal adjudica-
tions,137 as well as charging documents in enforcement actions heard
by courts or other agencies.138  Agencies also announce regulatory in-
terpretations in orders following informal adjudications, with few at-
tendant procedural safeguards.139  Furthermore, agencies often issue
133 See id. at 230 (“It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative
action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure
tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such
force.”); id. at 218, 227, 229–31.
134 See id. at 228–31.
135 See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 823–26 (2010);
Bressman, supra note 16, at 563; Bressman, supra note 17, at 1487–88; Merrill, supra note 17, at
813–14; Pierce, supra note 16, at 583; Stephenson, supra note 17, at 533–34; Cass R. Sunstein,
Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2603
(2006); Vermeule, supra note 17, at 349.
136 See, e.g., Barron & Kagan, supra note 16, at 234–57; Bressman, supra note 16, at 576–80;
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 6, at 858–60.
137 See, e.g., Humanoids Grp. v. Rogan, 375 F.3d 301, 305 (4th Cir. 2004).
138 See, e.g., Trinity Marine Nashville, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm’n, 275 F.3d 423, 429 (5th Cir. 2001).
139 See, e.g., Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 447 (4th
Cir. 2003); Shell Offshore Inc. v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 2001).1484 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1449
their interpretations of their regulations via interpretive rules.  Some-
times these take the form of published guidance manuals that provide
broad and general statements about how the agency intends to imple-
ment its regulations.140  In other cases, these interpretive statements
appear as letters to interested parties,141 ad hoc memoranda or an-
nouncements,142 or speeches by agency officials.143  There are also nu-
merous instances in which an agency does not announce its views on
the meaning of its regulation until the issue arises in litigation, at
which point the agency makes its position known in a brief to the
court.144
In light of this variation in procedural form, it seems reasonable
to ask whether Mead’s rationale might also extend to Seminole Rock.
After all, Mead suggests that it is presumptively implausible that Con-
gress meant to delegate to agencies the power to determine the mean-
ing of unclear statutory provisions in procedurally informal
contexts.145  Might one apply the same logic to Seminole Rock, and
conclude that although it is usually sensible to presume that a congres-
sional delegation to an agency of the power to make rules implicitly
includes a delegation of the power to issue definitive interpretations
of those rules, this presumption is appropriate only when these inter-
pretations are issued in certain forms, but not others?  Admittedly, the
current caselaw does not appear to endorse any such principle.  Al-
though a handful of circuit court cases in the immediate aftermath of
Mead suggested that Mead had undermined the basis for Seminole
Rock,146 subsequent cases—including several Supreme Court deci-
sions147—have continued to invoke Seminole Rock without attention
to the form in which the agency promulgated its regulatory interpreta-
140 See, e.g., Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 581–82 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
141 See, e.g., Beaver Plant Operations, Inc. v. Herman, 223 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 2000).
142 See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171 (2007).
143 See, e.g., United States v. Lachman, 387 F.3d 42, 54–55 (1st Cir. 2004).
144 See, e.g., Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 397 (2008).
145 See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
146 See, e.g., Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 142, 154–55 (3d Cir. 2004);
Keys v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2003); U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Comm’r, 270 F.3d
1137, 1142 (7th Cir. 2001).
147 See Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2469–73
(2009) (citing Auer in giving complete deference to interpretation contained in internal agency
memorandum and agency practice); Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. at 171 (giving Seminole
Rock deference to agency interpretation contained only in intra-agency memorandum); cf.
Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 399–400 (implying that Seminole Rock deference is appropriate for ami-
cus brief and internal directives, as long as regulation does not parrot the statute).2011] SEMINOLE ROCK’S DOMAIN 1485
tion.148  Nonetheless, the caselaw on the interaction between Mead
and  Seminole Rock is still quite sparse, especially at the Supreme
Court level, and it is possible that the doctrine might develop in such a
way that Mead-like constraints on Seminole Rock’s domain emerge.
Would such a development be welcome?
In exploring this question, it may be helpful to consider four sep-
arate dimensions of the policymaking form in which an agency
chooses to announce its regulatory interpretation.  The first dimen-
sion, and the one that most closely tracks Mead, is the degree of pro-
cedural formality that accompanied the agency’s promulgation of its
interpretation.  The second dimension is the place in the administra-
tive hierarchy from which the interpretation issued: Was the decision
announced by the agency head, or some other senior agency official?
Or was the interpretation issued by a lower-level official, and only
ratified later (perhaps after the commencement of litigation) by the
agency’s leadership?  The third dimension of policymaking form is the
timing and context of the interpretive declaration—in particular,
whether the interpretation was issued in the context of litigation (as a
brief), or prior to litigation.  The fourth dimension is the degree of
particularity or generality of the interpretation: Is the interpretation
aimed at a very specific application or transaction?  Or is it a more
general interpretation of a regulation, which might apply to a large set
of parties in a variety of contexts?
Consider first the dimension of procedural formality. Mead and
associated cases in the Chevron context have suggested that greater
procedural formality ought to be associated with greater judicial def-
erence.  Although that conclusion is certainly contestable, if we accept
it (at least provisionally), how might it apply in the Seminole Rock
context?  As noted above, the question of Seminole Rock deference to
a notice-and-comment rule would never arise.  Nonetheless, some reg-
ulatory interpretations are accompanied by more formal process than
are others.  In particular, some regulatory interpretations are issued in
orders following formal adjudications, which entail extensive hearing
and participation rights as well as significant constraints on the
148 See Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Leavitt, 509 F.3d 1259, 1272 (10th Cir. 2007);
Excel Corp. v. USDA, 397 F.3d 1285, 1296 (10th Cir. 2005); Humanoids Grp. v. Rogan, 375 F.3d
301, 307 (4th Cir. 2004); Air Brake Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632, 644 (6th Cir. 2004); Zurich
Am. Ins. Co. v. Whittier Props. Inc., 356 F.3d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004); Taylor v. Vt. Dep’t of
Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 780 n.7 (2d Cir. 2002); Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1046–47
(8th Cir. 2002); Am. Express Co. v. United States, 262 F.3d 1376, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Akzo
Nobel Salt, Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 212 F.3d 1301, 1304 (D.C. Cir.
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agency’s decisionmaking process.149  One might therefore limit strong
Seminole Rock deference to orders issued following formal adjudica-
tions, while conferring a lesser degree of deference—akin to Skid-
more—to interpretations contained in informal orders or interpretive
rules.
Such a regime would be broadly consistent with Mead and would
go some way toward addressing the self-delegation problem: although
agencies might still have an incentive to enact open-ended regulations
that the agency can clarify later, at least the agency could not issue an
authoritative clarification without first going through a more elabo-
rate hearing process that both imposes decision costs on the agency
and provides more formalized mechanisms for interested parties to
lodge objections and to challenge the factual suppositions that may
undergird the agency’s interpretive choice.  The agency, then, would
again face a “pay me now or pay me later” situation when deciding on
the optimal level of precision in the initial legislative rule.
This approach might also redress one of the difficulties associated
with Mead itself: the concern that Mead, coupled with Seminole Rock
deference to interpretive rules, gives agencies stronger incentives to
rush out skeletal notice-and-comment rules that the agency can then
“clarify” in subsequent interpretive rules.  In his Mead dissent, Justice
Scalia raised this possibility as a reason to reject Mead,150 but perhaps
it is more a reason to reject Seminole Rock for interpretive rules, as
opposed to formal adjudications.
Restricting Seminole Rock deference to interpretations issued in
formal adjudications, while granting only Skidmore respect to inter-
pretations contained in interpretive rules or informal orders, does
raise some complicated questions about how such a rule would affect
the incentives of agencies and regulated parties, as well as about how
courts should deal with the fact that an agency may sometimes ad-
vance the same interpretation in different forms at different times.  To
illustrate the possible complications and difficulties, consider the fol-
lowing stylized timeline of the interaction between an agency and a
potential regulatory target:
• At time T1, the agency adopts a legislative rule.
• At time T2, the agency may (but need not) promulgate an
interpretive rule clarifying some ambiguity in the legisla-
tive rule enacted at T1.
149 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556–57 (2006).
150 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 246 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).2011] SEMINOLE ROCK’S DOMAIN 1487
• At time T3, a regulated party chooses a course of conduct.
If the agency announced its interpretation at T2, the regu-
lated party may either choose to conform to the agency’s
interpretation or to take some action that, although argua-
bly consistent with the legislative rule announced at T1, is
inconsistent with the agency interpretation announced at
T2.
• At time T4, the agency may (but need not) bring an en-
forcement action against the regulated party, if the agency
believes that party has violated the legislative rule (as in-
terpreted by the agency).  The agency’s final decision on
this point, which includes the proper interpretation of the
regulation, is announced after a formal adjudication.  Let
us suppose that the doctrine endorses the strong antire-
troactivity principle, such that even if the agency’s inter-
pretation at T4 is entitled to Seminole Rock deference, the
agency cannot impose sanctions based on that interpreta-
tion if it failed to provide adequate notice of its view.
In this stylized setup, what would be the effect of a doctrinal rule
that conferred strong Seminole Rock deference to the interpretation
announced by the agency at T4, but weaker Skidmore respect to the
interpretation announced at T2?
First, it is likely that the antiretroactivity principle would give the
agency a strong incentive to announce its interpretation at T2.  If it
failed to do so, then the regulatory target would likely take its most
preferred action at T3 (even if it suspects the agency would disap-
prove), because it is shielded from sanctions (though it may still be
barred from continuing in this course of conduct).  If the agency does
announce its interpretation at T2 (as an interpretive rule), and the reg-
ulatory target does not immediately challenge it but instead takes ac-
tion contrary to the agency’s interpretation, then the agency can bring
an enforcement action. If the agency’s interpretation following formal
adjudication at T4 matches the agency’s interpretation at T2, then the
agency will be entitled to Seminole Rock deference and will be able to
impose sanctions on the regulatory target without a retroactivity prob-
lem.151  This suggests that the regulatory target would have a strong
151 Of course, the formal hearing is presumed to create at least the possibility that the
agency’s interpretation at T4 will be different—and perhaps more favorable to the target—than
the interpretation at T2, or at least that the agency’s anticipation of a formal hearing at T4 influ-
ences its interpretive choice at T2 in socially desirable ways.1488 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1449
incentive to challenge an unfavorable interpretation immediately after
T2, prior to taking action at T3.152
If the target brings suit immediately after the agency issues an
(informal) interpretation at T2, then under the current regime the
court would simply apply Seminole Rock to the T2 interpretation.  But
suppose the reviewing court has adopted the position that regulatory
interpretations that are announced as interpretive rules are reviewed
under  Skidmore, rather than Seminole Rock.  Then what happens?
There are a few possibilities to consider here.
First, if the court upholds the agency’s T2 interpretation under the
lesser Skidmore standard of review, then the regulatory target could
anticipate, a fortiori, that the court would also uphold the agency’s
interpretation if it were issued in an order following formal adjudica-
tion.  Thus, if the court applied a lower standard of review but upheld
the agency’s interpretation, a rational regulatory target at T3 would
conform its conduct to the agency interpretation announced at T2, ob-
viating the need for administrative adjudication at T4.
If the court strikes down the agency’s T2 interpretation, the subse-
quent choices of the regulatory target and the agency become less
clear.  Suppose the target follows the court’s lead and defies the
agency’s interpretation, and the agency brings an enforcement action
and re-endorses its earlier interpretation after a formal adjudication at
T4.  It is possible that the court would uphold the agency’s T4 interpre-
tation, despite the fact that the court had invalidated exactly the same
interpretation earlier, in the litigation following T2.  That may seem
like a deviation from the stare decisis principle, but in fact it is consis-
tent with the notion that the T4 interpretation, though identical to the
T2 interpretation in substance, is entitled to a more deferential stan-
dard of review because it was issued through a more formal process.
This might lead a regulated party to conform its conduct to the
agency’s interpretation at T2, despite a judicial rejection of the
agency’s interpretation.
On the other hand, if a court rules against an agency’s interpreta-
tion at T2, then the agency might rationally anticipate that it is likely
152 This assumes that the target would have standing to bring such a challenge, and that the
agency’s interpretive rule is judicially reviewable.  Although courts are often reluctant to review
informal agency statements, in a scenario like that described in the hypothetical, where the inter-
pretive rule would have an immediate practical coercive impact on an identifiable party, the
dispute might well be justiciable. See, e.g., Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1120–21 (9th Cir.
2004), aff’d, Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); Am. Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 707 F.2d 548, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Nat’l Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz,
443 F.2d 689, 701–02 (D.C. Cir. 1971).2011] SEMINOLE ROCK’S DOMAIN 1489
to lose again at T4, even under a more deferential standard of review.
Because administrative adjudication and litigation are costly, the
agency might therefore modify its interpretation.  In this case, the ju-
dicial ruling on the T2 interpretation functions mostly as a signal of
what the court would do if the agency adopted the same, or very simi-
lar, interpretation at T4.
Perhaps the most sensible thing a court could do in this situation
would be to state explicitly, in the T2 decision, whether the agency’s
interpretation would fail under both the Skidmore standard and the
Seminole Rock standard, or whether the interpretation, though unac-
ceptable under Skidmore, might possibly survive if the agency
repromulgated it after a formal adjudicative hearing that provided
more thorough administrative ventilation of the issues and opportuni-
ties for adversarial contestation.  But, for a variety of reasons, courts
may be reluctant to opine on how the case would have come out
under a different standard of review.
Although it is difficult to sort out the likely result of these con-
flicting incentives, we hypothesize that it would be net beneficial to
adopt a set of rules that: (1) confers Seminole Rock deference on regu-
latory interpretations issued after formal adjudication (at T4); (2) ap-
plies something like Skidmore respect to interpretive rules issued
without meaningful procedural safeguards (at T2); and (3) bars the
imposition of sanctions if the agency failed to provide adequate notice
(by failing to announce its T4 interpretation at T2).  In most cases, we
conjecture that the agency would have an incentive to announce its
interpretation at T2, rather than waiting until T4, so that the agency
could deter conduct that it believes is contrary to the regulation.  This
would serve the interest in adequate notice.  We further conjecture
that most regulated parties would conform their conduct to the
agency’s  T2 interpretation.  Such parties would only be inclined to
contravene the agency’s interpretation at T3, or to initiate litigation
prior to T3, if they anticipated either that the agency would reach a
different conclusion after full formal hearings, or that the agency
might well lose under Skidmore and would be unwilling to bear the
additional procedural costs and subsequent relitigation costs to try to
secure a more favorable interpretation under Seminole Rock.  This
possibility, in turn, would give agencies a stronger incentive to write
clearer legislative rules.  At the same time, even if a regulated party
thought that it might have a good shot at prevailing under Skidmore, if
that party anticipates that the agency would continue to press its pre-
ferred interpretation in a formal administrative enforcement action at1490 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1449
T4, and the agency would be likely to prevail on relitigation, then the
regulated party might simply conform at T3 rather than incurring (and
imposing) socially wasteful administrative and judicial decision costs.
This seems to create desirable incentives for agencies and regulated
parties.
Of course, other results are possible.  For instance, an agency
might choose to forgo issuing an interpretive rule at T2, so that the
first time the court reviews the agency’s interpretation, the governing
standard is Seminole Rock, even though this might create a retroactiv-
ity problem that precludes the agency from imposing sanctions.  This
might occur if the agency anticipates that the court will be reluctant to
uphold an interpretation issued in a formal adjudication if the court
had recently rejected that same interpretation in an interpretive rule,
notwithstanding the difference in the standard of review.  That might,
in turn, lead agencies to abstain from announcing their interpretive
views in advance.  Such an outcome seems undesirable.  We cannot
rule out this possibility, so our discussion above should be treated as a
tentative hypothesis.  We leave to subsequent work the task of analyz-
ing more rigorously the incentive effects of different doctrinal re-
gimes, but we suggest that at least some modifications to the current
regime—modifications that reduce deference to less formal regulatory
interpretations—might have desirable effects.
Another difficulty with the proposal to limit Seminole Rock def-
erence to interpretations issued in formal orders is that not all regula-
tory issues are resolved by formal adjudication.153  Indeed, many
statutory schemes do not require formal adjudication under the
APA.154  Although the agency could voluntarily add additional proce-
dural requirements even to informal adjudications, doing so may be
quite costly and therefore practically infeasible or undesirable.  This
sort of doctrinal limit on Seminole Rock’s domain, then, would mean
that Skidmore (or de novo review) would replace Seminole Rock as
the governing standard of review in some regulatory policy areas.
That result would be undesirable to the extent that it sacrifices the
virtues associated with Seminole Rock—expertise, accountability, flex-
ibility, and the like.
That said, this might well be a cost worth bearing.  If one takes
seriously the importance of the “pay me now or pay me later” doctri-
nal bargain as the key constraint on administrative self-delegation,
153 See Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedure and the Decline of
the Trial, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 496–97 (2003).
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then if Congress has not provided a “pay me now” option (in the form
of a more elaborate and transparent procedural vehicle for announc-
ing regulatory interpretations), then “pay me later” (by satisfying a
somewhat more demanding standard of review) is the only game in
town, and one that Congress should be presumed to have imposed on
the agency.  Again, this is only a tentative hypothesis, and others may
weigh the costs and benefits differently, but it seems at least plausible
that a doctrinal rule limiting Seminole Rock deference to interpreta-
tions produced by a formal adjudicative process would be desirable on
net.
Let us now turn to a second dimension of the policymaking form
in which an agency may announce its interpretation of a regulation:
the place in the administrative hierarchy from which the interpreta-
tion issues.  This consideration, like considerations of procedural for-
mality, has its analog in the Chevron context: although Mead focused
on issues of procedural formality rather than hierarchy, some schol-
ars—most prominently Professor David Barron and now-Justice
Elena Kagan—have argued that the logic of Chevron (particularly the
political accountability rationale) implies that the seniority of the
agency official who takes responsibility for the interpretive decision
should be the main consideration.155  Their argument is that Chevron
deference is most appropriate when an interpretation is issued by se-
nior agency leaders, or is endorsed by them prior to litigation in some
prominent and public way.156  By contrast, when an interpretation is-
sues from lower-level officials, and is endorsed only belatedly by the
senior leadership, Skidmore supplies the proper standard of review.157
This view has gained little traction in the current doctrine, though it
remains to be seen whether Elena Kagan’s elevation to the Supreme
Court will change that.  For present purposes, the main question is
whether something like the Barron-Kagan hierarchy principle should
apply in the Seminole Rock context.  Should agencies get Seminole
Rock deference only if the regulatory interpretation is announced or
publicly endorsed by the agency’s senior leadership prior to litigation?
Or should interpretations announced by lower-level agency officials
also be entitled to Seminole Rock deference?
Whatever the merits of the Barron-Kagan proposal in the Chev-
ron context, we think that the case for using the hierarchical location
of the agency interpreter as a criterion for the level of deference is no
155 See Barron & Kagan, supra note 16, at 201–02.
156 See id. at 235–39, 259–60.
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stronger, and probably somewhat weaker, in the Seminole Rock con-
text.  In both contexts, the strongest argument for the Barron-Kagan
position is that withholding deference from interpretations issued by
lower-level actors will create incentives for senior officials either to
make key decisions themselves or to take ownership of—and there-
fore political accountability for—decisions made by subordinates.158
That may be a sufficient justification for hierarchy to function as a
limit on both Chevron’s domain and Seminole Rock’s domain, but the
Barron-Kagan proposal does little to address the self-delegation prob-
lem particular to the Seminole Rock context.  After all, if the concern
is self-delegation, and if senior agency officials are the ones who are
typically responsible for promulgating legislative rules, then withhold-
ing Seminole Rock deference from other, lower-level officials would
not seem to have much of an effect on the incentives of agency leaders
to promulgate open-ended regulations.  If anything, self-delegation is
less likely to be a problem when a lower-level official is the one who
issues an interpretation of the ambiguous regulation.
Moreover, one of the chief arguments in favor of Seminole Rock
is the impossibility of resolving in advance the myriad issues that may
arise when a regulation must be applied to particular parties or trans-
actions—issues that are more likely to be handled by lower-level offi-
cials.  An interpretive question significant enough to attract the
attention of a senior agency official prior to litigation is more likely to
be a question that is sufficiently prominent that the agency could and
should address it through a legislative rule.  Thus, withholding Semi-
nole Rock deference from lower-level interpretive rulings might elimi-
nate such deference in those cases where it is most needed, while
leaving unaffected those contexts in which it is most problematic.
None of this is to say that courts should reject the Barron-Kagan
proposal to withhold deference from interpretations that are not
promulgated or endorsed by an agency’s senior leaders.  It is certainly
plausible that this rule would be a desirable limit on both Chevron’s
domain and Seminole Rock’s domain, one that would prompt agency
leaders to take responsibility for potentially controversial agency ac-
tions.  Our only argument here is that, whatever the other benefits of
the Barron-Kagan proposal, it does little to address the self-delegation
concerns that arise in the Seminole Rock context.
Yet a third dimension of the policymaking form issue concerns
whether courts should grant Seminole Rock deference to interpreta-
158 See id. at 242–44.2011] SEMINOLE ROCK’S DOMAIN 1493
tions that appear for the first time in litigation briefs.  As noted above,
courts—including the Supreme Court—have frequently extended
Seminole Rock deference to litigation briefs, usually on the originalist
logic that the position contained in the brief is likely to reflect the
agency’s position, which in turn is likely to reflect the true intent of
the regulation.159  If we adopt a pragmatic rationale, which looks to
considerations like expertise and accountability as justifications for as-
suming a congressional intent to delegate, but that also takes seriously
Mead’s observation that some interpretations are not deference wor-
thy, this position strikes us as misguided.  It is now reasonably well
established that an agency does not get Chevron deference for a statu-
tory interpretation that appears for the first time in a litigation brief.160
There is little reason, given the pragmatic arguments for and against
Seminole Rock, to take a different position with respect to administra-
tive interpretations of regulations.  If one believes, plausibly, that
Congress would not and should not allow an agency to authoritatively
construe a statute in a post hoc litigation brief (written by agency law-
yers in an adversarial context), then it is hard to articulate a good
reason for assuming that Congress would nonetheless delegate to
agencies the power to authoritatively construe regulations in this way.
Arguments to the contrary typically draw on an implicit originalist ra-
tionale, even as the courts that make such arguments seem to reject
the originalist rationale for Seminole Rock when considering other as-
pects of the doctrine.
Indeed, the arguments against deferring to a litigation brief are
even more compelling in the Seminole Rock context than in the Chev-
ron context.  First, and most importantly, granting Seminole Rock def-
erence to litigation briefs exacerbates the self-delegation problem by
giving the agency even more freedom and incentive to promulgate
open-ended rules to be clarified only later—indeed, only if and when
some party litigates the issue.  Second, if the agency does not advance
an interpretation of the regulation at issue until litigation (perhaps
litigation in which the agency is not even a party), it is much less plau-
sible that the interpretive issue is one that the agency had no choice
but to confront in the course of implementing the statute.  For these
reasons, we think there are powerful arguments for withholding Semi-
nole Rock deference from litigation briefs, even if one rejects our ear-
159 See supra notes 32, 147–48 and accompanying text.
160 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228, 238 n.19 (2001); Bowen v. Ge-
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lier suggestion that courts should withhold Seminole Rock deference
from interpretations announced outside of formal adjudications.
A fourth dimension of the form of an agency’s regulatory inter-
pretation is the generality or particularity of the interpretation.  As
noted above, sometimes agency regulatory interpretations are nar-
rowly focused: the agency releases an opinion letter or issues an adju-
dicative order that deals with a very specific party, dispute, or
transaction.161  In other instances, an agency issues a regulatory inter-
pretation with broad ramifications for a large number of parties or
transactions.162  This is most obvious in the case of the guidance manu-
als that agencies sometimes publish.  It may also be true even of adju-
dicative orders: notwithstanding that such orders are ostensibly
focused on the individual parties to the dispute, the agency order may
state a broad interpretive principle that would clearly affect many
other cases, and that would serve as an administrative precedent and
authoritative announcement of the agency’s position.163  Should the
generality of a regulatory interpretation affect the appropriate level of
deference under Seminole Rock?  If so, how?  To make this a bit more
concrete, consider a comparison between an administrative interpre-
tation contained in a general guidance manual and an interpretation
issued in an opinion letter directed at a particular party or transac-
tion.164  Does one or the other type of interpretive pronouncement
have a greater claim to Seminole Rock deference?  Plausible argu-
ments are possible in both directions.
On the one hand, the more general guidance manual might have
a stronger claim to judicial deference on the grounds that its general-
ity suggests that the agency is not opportunistically adopting a particu-
lar interpretation in order to reach a desired result in a specific case.
Moreover, if courts granted Seminole Rock deference to broadly ap-
plicable interpretations found in guidance manuals, but not to inter-
pretations contained in ad hoc opinion letters or orders, then agencies
might have a stronger incentive to issue such clarifying documents in
advance, and to consider broadly the implications of a given regula-
tory interpretation for a range of possible cases.  Thus, a doctrine that
favored (through a more deferential standard of review) general over
161 See supra notes 126–27, 129 and accompanying text.
162 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
163 See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
164 By temporarily putting to one side interpretations contained in formal adjudicative or-
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particular regulatory interpretations might be desirable for some of
the same reasons that commentators, and some judges, have argued
for the superiority of rulemaking over adjudication as a mode of gen-
eral administrative policymaking.165
On the other hand, although granting more deference to general
interpretive rules might redress concerns about fair notice and admin-
istrative arbitrariness, such a doctrinal distinction does little to address
the self-delegation concern (except insofar as removing Seminole
Rock deference from a subset of interpretive rules gives agencies
stronger incentives to write clearer regulations up front).  Indeed, if
the main concern is self-delegation—and if the main argument for
preserving Seminole Rock is the inability of agencies to anticipate all
possible interpretive questions in advance—then one might reach pre-
cisely the opposite conclusion about the types of regulatory interpre-
tations most worthy of deference.  If the agency can anticipate, and
frame at a high level of generality, questions of regulatory interpreta-
tion, then the assertion that the agency could not practically have in-
corporated the answers to these questions in the legislative rule itself
may ring false.  Indeed, if an agency promulgates a legislative rule,
and shortly thereafter publishes a guidance manual that fills in a lot of
additional detail, one might be especially suspicious that the agency
was deliberately circumventing the notice-and-comment process by
leaving important general issues to subsequent “clarification,” rather
than raising and resolving them in the rule itself.  By contrast, when an
agency issues an interpretation in an individual case, and that inter-
pretation pertains to a relatively specific question about the applica-
tion of the regulation in particular circumstances, then it is more
plausible for the agency to claim that it could not, and did not, antici-
pate the issue ahead of time.
Note the parallels between these conflicting arguments and the
arguments related to whether courts should give more or less defer-
ence to regulatory interpretations issued long after the promulgation
of the legislative rule itself.  On the one hand, incentivizing agencies
to announce their interpretations early and generally may yield sub-
stantial social benefits.  On the other hand, early and general interpre-
165 See, e.g., William T. Mayton, The Legislative Resolution of the Rulemaking Versus Adju-
dication Problem in Agency Lawmaking, 1980 DUKE L.J. 103, 103; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two
Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judi-
cial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 308–09; David L. Shapiro, The
Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L.
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tive rules might be especially suspicious if one is worried about self-
delegation, whereas interpretive rules issued much later on, in re-
sponse to a particular and perhaps unusual set of circumstances, are
more plausibly characterized as the inevitable gap filling that always
takes place when an agency has to implement a complex regulatory
scheme, rather than the sort of decision that ought to have been incor-
porated into the rule itself.
As was true with respect to contemporaneous versus later regula-
tory interpretations, we tentatively conclude that courts should not
take this factor into account when deciding how much deference is
due to an agency’s interpretation of a regulation.  Not only do the
arguments sketched above cut in opposite directions, but we tend to
think that neither set of arguments, even if true, would supply a suffi-
ciently strong reason to introduce this consideration into the doctrine
in light of the decision costs that such additional complexity would
entail.  This is especially so given that the generality or particularity of
a regulatory interpretation is a continuous rather than a dichotomous
variable, and its evaluation is highly subjective.
In sum, we believe that there may be good reasons to extend
Mead’s logic to the Seminole Rock context by reserving strong Semi-
nole Rock deference for interpretations issued in orders following for-
mal adjudications, while granting only Skidmore  respect to
interpretive rules and informal orders.  We are even more confident
that administrative interpretations contained only in litigation briefs
ought not to receive Seminole Rock deference.  We are agnostic as to
whether the point in the agency hierarchy from which the opinion is-
sues should matter, though we would tentatively conclude that this
factor should have the same consequences for both Chevron and Sem-
inole Rock.  And although we acknowledge that the generality or par-
ticularity of the interpretation may affect the case for deference, we
tend to think that this factor is too uncertain and too complicated to
justify incorporating it into the doctrine.
D. Separation of Powers Limitations: Promoting Division of
Regulatory and Interpretive Responsibility
Finally, let us consider how the Seminole Rock doctrine should
apply in contexts where more than one agency might have the author-
ity to interpret an agency regulation.  This issue is most likely to come
up in the context of so-called vertical split-enforcement regimes, in
which one agency has the authority to issue regulations (and, perhaps,
to initiate enforcement actions), but some other agency has the au-2011] SEMINOLE ROCK’S DOMAIN 1497
thority to adjudicate (at least on a final administrative appeal) alleged
violations of these regulations.166  Such schemes are relatively rare,
but when they do exist they are often quite important.  For example,
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) within
the Department of Labor has the authority to issue workplace safety
regulations pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and
OSHA also has the authority to initiate enforcement actions against
employers who violate these regulations.167  However, contested en-
forcement actions are resolved by the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission (“OSHRC”), an independent agency.168  The
Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act established a simi-
lar structure for the specialized agencies that deal with employment
conditions in mining operations (the Mine Safety and Health Admin-
istration (“MSHA”) and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission (“FMSHRC”)).169  Similarly, the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (“FAA”) and Coast Guard (both executive branch agen-
cies) establish regulations governing pilots of aircraft and seagoing
vessels, respectively, and can bring disciplinary actions against pilots
for violating these regulations, but pilots can appeal disciplinary sanc-
tions to the National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”), an inde-
pendent commission.170  When the agency with rulemaking or
enforcement authority interprets its regulation one way, but the
agency with final adjudicative authority interprets the regulation dif-
ferently, which agency (if either) ought to receive Seminole Rock
deference?
In Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission,171
the Supreme Court unanimously resolved this question in favor of the
agency with rulemaking authority.172 Martin involved the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act’s split-enforcement regime, described
above, in which OSHA has principal rulemaking, investigation, and
166 See generally George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclu-
sions from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315 (1987).
167 See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 147–48
(1991).
168 Id.
169 See, e.g., W. Christian Schumann, The Allocation of Authority Under the Mine Act: Is the
Authority to Decide Questions of Policy Vested in the Secretary of Labor or in the Review Com-
mission?, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 1063, 1065–66 (1996).
170 See Collins v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 351 F.3d 1246, 1248–49 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Enforcing Aviation Safety Regulations: The Case for a Split-Enforcement Model of
Agency Adjudication, 4 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 389, 396–98 (1991).
171 Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144 (1991).
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enforcement power, but any complaint brought by OSHA against a
firm for violations of OSHA regulations is adjudicated by OSHRC, a
separate and independent regulatory commission.173  At issue in Mar-
tin was the correct interpretation of an OSHA regulation that re-
quired employers in the steel industry to protect employees from
hazardous fumes emitted by coke ovens.174  OSHA interpreted the
text of its regulation to require not only that the employer supply the
employees with respirators and provide training in their use, but also
that the employer ensure the proper fit of each employee’s respira-
tor.175  Based on this interpretation, OSHA initiated an enforcement
action against a steel company.176  OSHRC, however, interpreted the
regulation differently.  According to OSHRC, the regulation at issue,
when viewed in conjunction with other regulations, was best read as
requiring only that the employer supply respirators and proper train-
ing, leaving the responsibility of ensuring proper fit to the employees
themselves.177
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice
Marshall, concluded that the regulation was ambiguous on this point:
both OSHA’s interpretation and OSHRC’s interpretations were rea-
sonable.178  The outcome in the case therefore turned on which of the
two agencies (if either) was entitled to deference under Seminole
Rock. Martin concluded that OSHA’s interpretation, rather than
OSHRC’s, was entitled to Seminole Rock deference. Martin rea-
soned, first, that because OSHA promulgated the standard in the first
place, it would be “in a better position than is [OSHRC] to recon-
struct the purpose of the regulations in question.”179  In addition to
this originalist argument, Martin concluded that both expertise and
accountability considerations favored granting Seminole Rock defer-
ence to OSHA’s interpretation rather than to OSHRC’s.  With re-
spect to expertise, Martin observed that, “by virtue of [OSHA’s]
statutory role as enforcer, [it] comes into contact with a much greater
number of regulatory problems than does [OSHRC],” which makes
OSHA “more likely to develop the expertise relevant to assessing the
effect of a particular regulatory interpretation.”180  With respect to ac-
173 Id. at 147–48.
174 Id. at 148.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 148–49.
178 Id. at 146.
179 Id. at 152.
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countability, the Martin opinion, drawing in part on the legislative his-
tory of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, argued that making
OSHA responsible both for formulating rules and interpreting those
rules in particular applications would further political accountability
by making a single agency responsible for regulatory policy choices.181
Although Martin took pains to insist that its holding was narrow and
context specific, subsequent courts have generally ignored this quali-
fier and consistently held that interpretive authority follows rulemak-
ing power, rather than adjudicative power, when the two are
divided.182  Indeed, Martin seems to be a rare example where a princi-
ple that arose originally in the Seminole Rock context has influenced
how courts have approached analogous issues in the Chevron context,
rather than the other way around.183
On an originalist rationale, Martin makes a good deal of sense:
the agency that promulgated the rule is much more likely to know
what it requires than is a separate agency, which encounters the rule
for the first time in a contested enforcement action.  But on the prag-
matic, Chevron-esque rationale, the case for the Martin rule is much
less clear.  Consider first the purported benefits of Seminole Rock def-
erence—expertise and accountability—both of which Martin stresses
as important reasons to confer deference on the rulemaking and en-
forcement agency (OSHA) rather than the adjudicating agency
(OSHRC).  Although it may be true that OSHA has somewhat
greater expertise than OSHRC with respect to the optimal design of
workplace safety rules, this advantage is likely to be much less pro-
nounced than the advantage that an administrative agency has over a
court.  After all, the usual explanations for agencies’ expertise advan-
tage, vis-` a-vis the judiciary, are that agencies specialize in the field and
are staffed by technical experts, whereas judges are generalists who
engage with the relevant issues only occasionally and intermittently.184
181 Id. at 153–54.
182 See, e.g., Speed Mining, Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 528 F.3d
310, 319 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Martin in the context of the split-enforcement scheme under the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act); Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of
Labor v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 982 F.2d 790, 794–95 (2nd Cir. 1992) (applying Martin in the
context of the split-enforcement scheme under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensa-
tion Act).
183 See, e.g., Speed Mining, 528 F.3d at 319 (citing Martin in the context of statutory inter-
pretation); Gen. Dynamics, 982 F.2d at 794–95 (applying Martin to determine which agency’s
statutory interpretation should prevail).
184 See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651–52 (1990) (“[T]he
judgments about the way the real world works that have gone into the [agency’s] policy are
precisely the kind that agencies are better equipped to make than are courts.  This practical1500 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1449
This difference does not exist—at least not to the same degree—in the
vertical split-enforcement context.  OSHRC also specializes in work-
place safety issues, and is staffed (at least in theory) by experts in the
field.  It may be true, as the Martin opinion suggests, that OSHA still
has an advantage due to its larger staff and its broader experience
with implementing any given rule.  But even if one accepts the claim
that expertise considerations favor deference to OSHA rather than
OSHRC, that advantage seems relatively slight.
What about the political accountability justification for Seminole
Rock, which Martin also emphasizes?185  There are two related but dis-
tinct reasons why accountability values might arguably be better
served by conferring Seminole Rock deference on OSHA rather than
OSHRC.  First, though Martin does not emphasize this point, OSHA
is an executive branch department, and therefore is more likely to be
responsive to the President and, through the President, to the electo-
rate.186  Second, the concentration of power over policy decisions in
one agency may further political accountability by making it clearer—
both to the electorate and to other political actors—which entity is
responsible for policy.  On this logic, if OSHA is responsible both for
the promulgation of a regulation and for subsequent clarification of
that regulation’s meaning, we can confidently assign credit or blame to
OSHA depending on our assessment of how well that regulatory re-
quirement is working.  If OSHA issues the regulation but OSHRC
interprets it, then if we are dissatisfied with the impact of the regula-
tion, we are less sure whom to blame: Did OSHA issue a misguided
regulation?  Did OSHRC twist or distort the regulation, giving it a
meaning that OSHA never intended?  We can find these things out if
we investigate further, but we often will not invest the time or effort
to do so, and will end up confused or uncertain about the agency most
responsible for regulatory outcomes.  Thus, the division of rulemaking
and interpretive authority arguably creates what political scientists
sometimes call a “clarity of responsibility” problem.187
agency expertise is one of the principal justifications behind Chevron deference.” (footnote
omitted)).
185 See Martin, 499 U.S. at 153–56.
186 Although it is not logically required that a vertical split-enforcement regime have an
independent commission act as the adjudicator and an executive agency act as the rulemaker and
enforcer, this is true for the most important vertical split-enforcement regimes, including the
occupational and transportation safety regimes noted earlier. See supra notes 168–70 and ac-
companying text.
187 See Jide O. Nzelibe & Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints: Separation
of Powers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. REV. 617, 623–24 & n.7
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Are these political accountability considerations sufficient to jus-
tify conferring Seminole Rock deference on OSHA rather than on
OSHRC?  Perhaps, but the case is much murkier than Martin implies,
and it is almost certainly weaker than the political accountability argu-
ment for giving interpretive authority to agencies rather than courts.
Consider the argument that political accountability favors deferring to
the executive branch agency rather than to the independent commis-
sion.  This claim is vulnerable to at least two criticisms (which are in
some tension with one another).  First, although OSHRC is more in-
sulated than OSHA from presidential influence, it may (partly for that
reason) be more susceptible to congressional influence.  Although it
was once fashionable to insist that the presidential influence was nec-
essarily more majoritarian than congressional influence,188 more re-
cent research has demonstrated that this is not necessarily so.189
Second, and perhaps more important, political accountability—in the
sense of responsiveness to the preferences of the politicians currently
in office—is not an unalloyed good.  Indeed, sometimes the whole
point of delegation to agencies is to insulate certain decisions from the
vicissitudes of day-to-day politics; that is why we have (and the courts
have upheld) independent agencies in the first place.190  Such insula-
tion can actually make policy outcomes over time more responsive to
the preferences of a majority of the electorate (which may be less vari-
able than the preferences of the political elites who vie for office).191
When Congress has taken the unusual step of assigning adjudicative
authority to a separate and independent commission, this is perhaps
an especially good indication that political accountability is less impor-
tant, in this context, than political insulation.192
What about the second argument, that dividing the authority to
promulgate a regulation from the authority to interpret that regula-
tion will create a “clarity of responsibility” problem?  Here again,
there is certainly something to the argument, but it should not be ex-
aggerated.  Most of the regulatory issues addressed in these split en-
forcement regimes, including the one at issue in Martin, do not attract
188 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48
ARK. L. REV. 23, 67 (1995); Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison’s Vision of the State: A
Public Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1341–43 (1994).
189 See Nzelibe, supra note 47; Stephenson, supra note 51, at 303–04.
190 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685–96 (1988); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602, 625–26 (1935); Kagan, supra note 6, at 2250–51.
191 See Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 53, 71–84 (2008).
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widespread and general public attention.  The parties that follow these
issues, and who may (through their advocacy, donations, or other
channels) have an impact on public opinion regarding the operation of
regulatory programs, are likely to be special interests (principally em-
ployers, unions, and public interest watchdogs) that are quite good at
separately evaluating the decisions of OSHA and OSHRC.  Thus, al-
though Martin may be right that the interest in political accountability,
like the interest in expertise, favors granting Seminole Rock deference
to OSHA rather than OSHRC, this advantage is mild at best.
On the other side of the ledger, the main concern about Seminole
Rock deference—that it concentrates lawmaking and interpretive
power in a single entity, thereby giving that entity the power and in-
centive to engage in undesirable self-delegations—decisively favors
granting Seminole Rock deference to OSHRC rather than to OSHA,
precisely the opposite of the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Martin.
The reasoning is straightforward: if Martin had come out the other
way, then OSHA could not circumvent procedural constraints by en-
acting a vague regulation and then clarifying it in subsequent (and
procedurally unconstrained) interpretive rules, because any ambiguity
in a legislative rule would be resolved by a different entity (OSHRC).
Under such a regime, the rulemaking agency would be in the same
position that Congress is in under the Chevron regime: some ambigu-
ity is inevitable, and perhaps even desirable, but the consequence of
ambiguity is not self-delegation but rather delegation to some other
body.  What makes this reverse-Martin rule particularly attractive is
that it solves the separation of powers problem without completely
jettisoning Seminole Rock’s advantages, particularly the advantage of
delegating interpretive power to a more expert decisionmaker (such
as OSHRC).
For these reasons, we suggest that Martin was wrongly decided.
By this we do not mean that Martin was inconsistent with governing
authorities or established principles; no authority at the time pre-
cluded Martin from announcing a presumption that interpretive au-
thority follows rulemaking authority.  We mean simply that the Martin
Court was wrong to choose this presumption rather than the equally
legitimate alternative presumption that interpretive authority follows
adjudicative authority when the two are divided between two agen-
cies.  This alternative presumption—a reverse-Martin rule—would
likely be only marginally worse on the expertise and accountability
dimensions, but it would eliminate completely the self-delegation
problem.  Thus Martin missed an opportunity to remedy the self-dele-2011] SEMINOLE ROCK’S DOMAIN 1503
gation problem that is usually inherent in Seminole Rock, but that can
be avoided in vertical split-enforcement systems.
That said, Martin is a well-established precedent, so even if we
are correct that it was wrong when decided, it may be difficult to do
anything about it now.  Difficult, but not impossible.  Even short of
overruling Martin (always a possibility, but probably not a realistic
one), courts might make greater use of Martin’s insistence that its rea-
soning is limited to the split-enforcement regime established under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act.  It might also be possible—
though perhaps a bit forced—for courts to suggest that Mead’s em-
phasis on likely congressional intent has called Martin into question.
Such an argument might draw on the idea, suggested above, that Con-
gress’s decision to split off adjudicative authority and to lodge it with a
separate agency indicates a congressional intent to deprive the
rulemaking agency of the usual degree of Seminole Rock deference.
Of course, such an argument could have been made (indeed, was
made) in Martin itself, but perhaps a court interested in overruling
Martin without saying so could use Mead as a convenient rationaliza-
tion.  Given our tentative conclusion that Martin was likely wrong, we
would view such a decision as justified on policy grounds, even if the
claim about changed doctrinal circumstances is somewhat disingenu-
ous.  It is of course also possible that Congress might respond by en-
acting a statutory provision that makes clear—either in general or
with respect to a particular split-enforcement scheme—that the au-
thority to resolve regulatory ambiguities follows the adjudicative
power, not the rulemaking power.  Because Seminole Rock, like Chev-
ron, is grounded on presumptive congressional intent, it would seem
there is no legal difficulty with overruling or limiting Martin in this
way.  That said, Congress has shown little inclination overall to alter
Chevron or Seminole Rock by statute.193
CONCLUSION
Federal judges and administrative law scholars continue to wres-
tle with the appropriate scope of Chevron’s domain.  Especially in the
wake of Mead, this issue has generated more controversy, and more
sophisticated scholarly commentary, than perhaps any other single
doctrinal problem in administrative law.  It is therefore somewhat sur-
prising that no comparable discussion has taken place about the ap-
propriate domain of Seminole Rock, Chevron’s vitally important but
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sometimes neglected counterpart.  Our objective in this Article has
been to pull together some of the existing strands in the doctrine and
scholarship, in order to move forward—and to make more promi-
nent—the analysis of Seminole Rock’s domain.
We have tentatively suggested some possible limits on Seminole
Rock, while tentatively rejecting other possibilities.  We have argued,
for example, that the courts should retain the antiplaceholder princi-
ple, should strengthen antiretroactivity limitations in the Seminole
Rock context, should reserve Seminole Rock deference for regulatory
interpretations contained in formal orders (granting Skidmore respect
to more informal interpretations), and should presume that interpre-
tive authority follows adjudicative authority rather than rulemaking or
prosecutorial authority when they are divided.  We have also sug-
gested that the timing, consistency, and generality of regulatory inter-
pretations should not affect the appropriate level of deference.  As we
stated at the outset, however, these particular prescriptive conclusions
are less important, in our view, than focusing greater scholarly atten-
tion on these questions, and approaching them in a more analytically
rigorous way.  The comparative neglect of questions regarding Semi-
nole Rock’s domain risks incoherence, unpredictability, and erosion of
important safeguards against administrative arbitrariness.  Our limited
objective in this Article has been to bring these issues to the fore, in
the hopes of prompting more, and more sophisticated, consideration
of these issues by other scholars, and perhaps (though this may be
wishful thinking) by the courts as well.